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PERSONALIZING NEGLIGENCE LAW
OMRI BEN-SHAHARI & ARIEL PORATt
The most fundamental feature of negligence law is the "reasonable person" stan-
dard. This feature bases negligence law on a strictly objective foundation: It
requires people to behave in the prudent way that, as Holmes explained, the ordi-
nary, typical member of their community observes. In this Article we argue that
with the increasing availability of information about actors' characteristics, negli-
gence law should give up much of its objectivity by allowing courts to "subjectify"
the standard of care-that is, to tailor it to the specific injurer's tendency to create
risks and his or her ability to reduce them. We discuss the effects of this personal-
ization of the standard of care on injurers' and victims' incentives to take care,
injurers' activity levels, and the injurers' ex ante investments in improving their
skills. We also discuss justice considerations as well as the feasibility of personaliza-
tion with the aid of "Big Data."
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INTRODUCTION
The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament,
intellect, and education which make the internal character
of a given act so different in different men.'
The most fundamental feature of negligence law is the "reason-
able person" standard. This feature bases negligence law on a strictly
objective foundation: It requires people to behave in the prudent way
that, as Holmes explained, the ordinary, typical member of their com-
munity observes. 2 The standard of care is uniform across the popula-
tion, rarely varying with the skills and dangers of each actor.
1 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 108 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS § 117, at 277 (1st ed. 2000) ("The duty owed by
all people generally-the standard of care-is the duty to exercise the care that would be
exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the same or similar circumstances
.... " (footnote omitted)); id. § 122, at 290 ("A reasonable person will act in the light of ...
knowledge shared by the community generally . . . .").
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This Article challenges the reasonable person paradigm. We
argue that with the increasing availability of accurate information
about actors' characteristics, negligence law should give up much of its
objectivity by allowing courts to "subjectify" the standard of care-
that is, to tailor it to the specific actor's tendency to create risks and
her ability to reduce them. Rather than addressing each actor as a
nondistinct member of a large pool and commanding her to meet the
level of reasonable precautions that correspond to the average compe-
tence within the pool, a personalized negligence law would separate
the actor from the pool and require her to meet her own customized
standard of care. The reasonable person standard, traditionally
derived from an aggregate relevant pool, would be replaced by the
"reasonable you" standard-a personalized command that is based on
information about this actor's specific characteristics.
The idea that standards of care ought to be personalized to the
particular circumstances of the particular defendant may strike our
readers as old news. Surely, a doctor is required to perform a treat-
ment at a more advanced level of care than a layperson, and a physi-
cally disabled person may be allowed to satisfy a lower level of
precaution. An actor who has special knowledge or experience may be
required to do more than one who has not.
Despite this intuition, tailored standards of care are the exception
in tort law, not the rule. From its early days, negligence law has wres-
tled with the personalization problem. When a cognitively limited
defendant who caused a fire asked the court to acknowledge his
incompetence and apply a more forgiving standard of care, the
court-in a landmark decision-refused, explaining that it would be
impossible for negligence liability to be "co-extensive with the judg-
ment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of
the foot of each individual." 3 The court, instead, chose "to adhere to
the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man
of ordinary prudence would observe." 4 Holmes later explained that
this approach was justified by the "impossibility of nicely measuring a
man's powers and limitations."5
Yet, over time, negligence law has created subcategories of
actors, lowering or raising the standard of care within each category to
reflect special skills. For example, children or the physically disabled
may be held to lower standards of care (although their license to
3 Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493; 3 Bing. 468, 475.
4 Id.
5 HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108.
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engage in the activity in the first place may be more stringent). 6 And,
conversely, medical professionals are held to higher standards than
nonprofessionals. 7
Personalized negligence law-the reasonable you standard-
takes this already familiar (but sparingly applied) approach of parti-
tioning injurers into relevant classes, and expands it to its conceptual
limit. Whereas the heightened standard of care for doctors creates a
specific pool (all doctors in the relevant practice, or the specific
advanced specialty), it still relies on average competence within a
defined pool to determine what is reasonable. Personalized negligence
law creates a pool of one for each defendant. What is reasonable for
this defendant would be determined, not by reference to the average
traits of some larger reference group to which this defendant belongs,
but only according to the information available about this defendant.
Consider, for example, a typical problem addressed by negligence
law: What is a reasonable driving speed in treacherous road condi-
tions? Imagine that a sixty-five-year-old driver, cruising at thirty-five
miles per hour, injures a child who jumped into the street chasing a
ball. Under prevailing negligence law, the court assumes that the
driver is no different than any other driver in the population and
would accordingly set the standard of care according to the capabili-
ties, the reaction time, and the tendency to inflict harm that the court
expects the average driver to have. If at a speed of thirty-five miles
per hour, the average brake time for drivers is thought to be short
enough even in relation to the risk of children playing in a residential
neighborhood, the sixty-five-year-old driver would not be regarded as
negligent.
Under personalized negligence law, the capabilities of the
average driver are not relevant. First, it might be true that the average
sixty-five-year-old driver has inferior driving capabilities and slower
response times than the average driver. If so, a speed of thirty-five
miles per hour might not be negligent for younger drivers, but would
be negligent for the elderly.8 Merely partitioning the population of
6 See infra Section L.A (describing lower standard of care for children and physically
disabled).
7 See infra Section I.B (describing heightened standard of care sometimes imposed on
those with elevated capacity).
8 It might be that older age brings more experience and responsibility, which could
pull in the other direction. This is typically the case with very young drivers versus older
drivers, but not when the ages are, say, forty-five and sixty-five. See, e.g., Judith L.
Charlton et al., Older Driver Distraction: A Naturalistic Study of Behaviour at Intersections,
58 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 271, 277 (2013) ("[O]lder drivers self-regulate by
limiting their engagement in secondary activities when the driving task is more challenging
compared with less demanding situations."); Tim Horberry et al., Driver Distraction: The
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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drivers and deriving the applicable standard of care from a smaller
subset of the population would be a first, albeit crude, step in
personalization.
But personalization would not stop there. Not all sixty-five-year-
old drivers are alike. The courts might have additional information
about the specific defendant, which would allow for further refine-
ment of the standard of care. Some of that information might relate to
his past driving experience. This would allow the court to make a sta-
tistical inference about the defendant's risk "type" and adjust his stan-
dard accordingly. Such personalization based on past experience is
similar to the "experience rating" methodology that insurers use in
inferring idiosyncratic risk, which then impacts the pricing of automo-
bile insurance policies.9 It is also similar to the approach used in crim-
inal law-treating past offenders differently than first timers.10
More interestingly, some of the additional information deployed
in constructing the reasonable you standard might relate to the defen-
dant's other characteristics, beyond his past driving record. It is infor-
mation reflecting on his driving capabilities, other risky activity he
takes, and his skills in reducing these risks. This information would
allow the court to make more reliable inferences about the risk that
this defendant creates, the risk he should have created, and the pre-
cautions he should have taken given his characteristics. With the aid of
more advanced information tools-including what has come to be
known as "Big Data"' 1-courts might know that the defendant is very
risk averse (or risk preferred), that he engages in frequent activities
that make his instincts and reactions faster (or slower) than those of
the average driver, or that in other parts of his life he is generally a
very careful (or careless) person. A clumsy, impulsive, or prone-to-
Effects of Concurrent In-Vehicle Tasks, Road Environment Complexity and Age on Driving
Performance, 38 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 185, 189-90 (2006) (studying effects
of distractions upon driving performance and finding that drivers over age of sixty tend to
drive more slowly and cautiously while distracted in order to compensate for slower
reaction times).
9 See Ragnar Norberg, The Credibility Approach to Experience Rating, 1979
SCANDINAVIAN ACTUARIAL J. 181, 181-82 ("[Driver] premiums are adjusted annually
according to bonus rules, which are to the effect that drivers with a favourable claims
record are allowed a premium deduction (bonus), whilst those with an unfavourable one
will experience a premium increase (malus).").
10 David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders,
110 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (2001) ("The legal system punishes repeat offenders more severely
than nonrepeat offenders. Second-time offenders receive more severe punishment than
first-time offenders; repeat offenders with many previous offenses receive more severe
punishment than repeat offenders with a few previous offenses.").
11 See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1433-53 (2014) (discussing concept of "Big Data,"
its legal applications, and its possible role in personalization of default rules).
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lapses person may need to be confronted with a more demanding
standard of care. Again, similar to the "feature rating" methodology
that insurers use to rate policyholders, courts could use statistical cor-
relations in assessing the risk posed by the defendant. Taking into
account every known relevant factor would assist the court in setting
the more efficient reasonable you standard, where the level of care is
tailored to a specific individual's risk creation and capacity to mitigate
that risk.
This Article examines the case for personalized negligence law
along two channels of inquiry. The first channel is normative: Does
personalization advance the goals of negligence law-efficient deter-
rence and just compensation? In exploring these questions, one of the
major contributions of this Article is the distinction between skill-
based and risk-based personalization. The Article demonstrates the
effects of personalization along those dimensions in various ways. The
first dimension-skill-based personalization-addresses each actor's
subjective ability to take precautions. This dimension measures how
effectively an actor can take precautions to reduce the risk of injury.
Thus, if there is a costly technological device that drivers can use to
reduce risks of driving, but which requires high technical skills to use
effectively, it might be cost justified to require only the technically
skillful drivers to use it.
The second dimension-risk-based personalization-addresses
each actor's riskiness. This dimension measures the different risks that
actors create at any given investment in care. Risk-based personaliza-
tion would place a greater precaution burden on actors who, at any
given level of care, create higher risks. For example, drivers with poor
eyesight, or who are easily distractible, create higher risks at any given
speed, and should be required to take more precautions and drive
slower than those with better eyesight or instincts.
In reality, actors' characteristics may combine both idiosyncratic
skill and riskiness. A driver may be both highly skilled and low risk.
She may have good eyesight and good instincts (that is, low risk), but
also high proficiency in utilizing accident prevention technologies. In
such cases, personalization should take into account both aspects,
which might counteract. Conversely, a low-skill driver would not be
required to install a costly skill-intensive precaution technology. But if
she is also a high-risk type, she would be required to take high alterna-
tive precautions.
This distinction between skillfulness and riskiness is fundamental
to our analysis. To be sure, under some abstractions the two dimen-
sions may be regarded as equivalent. Both high risk and low skill
increase the injurer-specific expected risk. It might be thought, then,
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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that unifying the two dimensions into a single analysis of personalized
expected risk would economize the analysis without sacrificing insight.
We show throughout the Article that this reductive form is too impov-
erished to capture important insights of legal design. Skill-based per-
sonalization raises a host of different concerns and implementation
problems than risk-based personalization. In an important set of cases,
we find that risk-based personalization is easier to defend, both on
efficiency and justice grounds.
The effects of personalization on efficient precaution taking are
just the tip of the iceberg. The Article identifies a wealth of effects
that personalized standards of care would have on injurers' precau-
tion, activity levels, and ex ante incentives to invest in reducing their
harmfulness. Relative to a regime of uniform standards, personaliza-
tion leads to more efficient precaution and has the potential to alle-
viate the excessive-activity distortion inherent in negligence rules.
Currently, negligence law incentivizes actors to become more skilled
at harm reduction but not to reduce their riskiness when possible. This
latter effect can be tackled, we show, if personalization is designed
correctly. Personalized standards also affect victims in predictable
ways. It might be intuitively thought that by facing personalized stan-
dards of care by injurers (say, drivers each obeying a different, person-
alized speed limit), victims endure a more uncertain and volatile
environment, thereby diminishing their ability to take efficient con-
tributory care. Not so. While drivers' speed-and other precautions-
may vary more under personalized standards, the risks that they pose
to victims may in fact be less variable and more easily mitigated.
The Article then turns to provide some benchmark observations
about how to evaluate personalization from a justice perspective.
Under some conceptions of corrective justice, personalization may be
regarded as problematic. Its primary prescription-to adjust the
injurer's obligation based on the cost of care-infringes the notion of
equality between the injurer and victim, because it allows the injurer
to unilaterally draw the line between his and the victim's rights. We
disagree with this evaluation. Why should a particularly skilled injurer
not owe a heightened duty of care to a victim, and be required to
correct this victim's harm when breaching the duty? Moreover, per-
sonalization is not merely about different burdens of care, but also
about different risks which different injurers create. We argue that
raising the liability standard for people who create above-average risk
and lowering the standard for people who create below-average risk is
required by any plausible corrective justice account. Lastly, we com-
ment on the distributive justice aspects of personalization. True, it
treats similarly situated injurers differently, and it might expose some
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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victims to higher risks of physical injury. But, quite intuitively, per-
sonalization has the potential of promoting equality among injurers
along important aspects, while at the same time increasing victims'
safety.
After presenting the normative inquiry, the Article turns to a pos-
itive channel. It asks whether personalization can be implemented.
What are the information obstacles to personalization and how can
they be addressed? What sources of information might be harnessed
to the personalization enterprise? Not surprisingly, we envision a pro-
cess that relies on advances in information technology, from in-depth
screenings of individuals to statistical analysis of large data. If Big
Data is reliably predictive in high-stakes industries like financial ser-
vices, insurance, and increasingly in medicine, why not utilize this pre-
dictive power in law?
It is not enough, however, to show that more data and better
screening could be deployed by courts in adjudication. The challenge
for a successful negligence regime is to show that actors would be able
to anticipate the more refined burdens and adjust their behavior. Oth-
erwise, if the greater ex post accuracy does not translate to ex ante
behavior, it might merely impose excessive information costs.1 2 Rec-
ognizing this dilemma, we make the counterintuitive argument that
personalization could make it easier, not harder, for actors to predict
the standard of care applicable to them. People often know better
what is reasonable for them to do, given their idiosyncratic character-
istics. It is harder to know what the average skills and risks are. Thus,
in the driving example, the prevailing reasonable person standard asks
the driver to meet a standard of care tailored to the impersonal rea-
sonable driver. But he is not this driver, and he would need much
more information than mere self-introspection to figure it out.
This Article fits within a literature that examined the optimal tai-
loring of legal rules. 13 The idea of personalizing default rules, for
example, has been studied in various contexts by several authors, 14
12 See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 150, 151 (1995) (arguing that low information costs for enforcement authority
improve complex rules' efficiency); cf Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICs 502, 504 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kaplow, General Characteristics] (discussing connection
between increased specificity in the law and greater information costs to both government
enforcement and private actors seeking to comply).
13 At the most general level, Louis Kaplow's work on the optimal precision of legal
rules lays a foundation for the inquiry into tailoring any legal command. Kaplow, General
Characteristics, supra note 12, at 502-07 (discussing possible problems caused by rule
precision and analyzing its negative and positive effects).
14 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-95, 97-98, 115-18 (1989)
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and further expanded recently by Ariel Porat and Lior Strahilevitz.15
In the torts literature, early law and economics writers recognized that
tailored duties could improve efficiency.1 6 Judge Richard Posner and
Steven Shavell have separately explained that the reason why the
standard of care is not adapted to the specific injurer is the saving of
administrative costs.' 7 Shavell further showed that if courts are con-
strained to apply a uniform standard of care for all injurers, they
should minimize the costs of some injurers taking too much, and
others taking too little, care.' 8 These writers, as well as Warren
Schwartz in an excellent article, have recognized that personalized
standards of care might have problematic effects on the level of
activity.' 9 They recognized that uniform standards could drive out the
activities of very high-risk injurers.20 Finally, both Shavell and
Schwartz recognized that the incentives to make ex ante investments
(such as being sober while driving or acquiring information about
(differentiating between tailored, untailored, and penalty default rules in contract law and
providing theory for when courts should fill contractual gaps using each method); George
S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1109, 1114-15, 1129-59 (2006) (offering models of tailored and untailored default rules
under particular sets of assumptions to analyze welfare implications of trading off precision
against complexity); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-10,
56-57 (2013) (differentiating between impersonal default rules, active choosing, and
personalized default rules, and concluding that the choice between regimes is dependent
on costs of decisions and errors, and therefore varies between target groups).
15 Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 1470-72 (suggesting use of Big Data to
personalize disclosures, thereby increasing their relevance and effectiveness).
16 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 124 (1987) (arguing that uniform standard creates two effects of misallocation:
injurers with low marginal costs of taking care would have no incentive to take care
beyond the reasonable person standard, even though it would be socially desirable for
them to do so, and injurers with slightly higher than average marginal costs of care would
nevertheless adhere to the uniform standard so as to avoid bearing all liability).
17 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 218 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing that
reasonable person standard adhered to by courts is justified by administrative costs courts
would bear in attempting to measure actual individual costs of each party); see STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 89 (1987) (suggesting that
classification of injurers would allow courts to set optimal level of care for each class type
and therefore "it is socially desirable for courts to acquire information about an injurer's
type if the cost of doing so is sufficiently low").
18 See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 86-88 (showing that if courts cannot determine an
injurer's type, they would choose single care level that is optimal for average type of
injurer).
19 E.g., Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining
the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and
Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241, 247-50 (1989) ("[A] single standard is preferable to a rule of
subjective negligence because, unlike a rule of subjective negligence, it creates self-
enforcing incentives for optimal behavior in deciding whether to engage in the activity.").
20 E.g., SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 91 ("[I]t may be socially beneficial for courts not to
reduce due care for types of injurers for whom the socially optimal level of care would be
low, because such types of injurers may thereby be induced not to engage in the activity.").
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risks) would be affected by a personalized standards regime.21 None
of these authors, however, have examined the distinction between
injurers who vary by skill and injurers who vary by riskiness.22
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the concept of
personalizing the standard of care and outlines some of its appear-
ances in prevailing tort law. Part II develops the claim that personal-
izing the standard of care is generally more efficient than having a
"one-size-fits-all" standard of care. Part III looks at personalizing the
standard of care from a justice perspective, showing that while correc-
tive justice notions might be consistent with personalization in only
some cases, distributive justice considerations support personalization
in many more cases. Part IV explains how personalization could be
broadly implemented in negligence law with the aid of Big Data,
among other things. It also makes the claim that even if full-fledged
personalization could not be implemented (yet), two alternatives
would be (i) to apply a gradual personalization regime, according to
which courts would have to choose whether to impose a high,
medium. or low level of care at any specific case brought before them;
and (ii) to utilize presumptions designed to elicit private information
out of litigants. Lastly, the Conclusion summarizes our proposal for
personalization of the standard of care, pointing out several options
for personalization, and offers a few extensions to other fields of the
law.
I
PERSONALIZED NEGLIGENCE UNDER EXISTING LAW
Current law does not personalize standards of care. It adheres,
instead, to a regime of uniform, nonpersonalized standards. The Third
Restatement states: "A person acts negligently if the person does not
exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances." 2 3 Reasonable
care requires balancing the "foreseeable likelihood that the person's
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that
may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the
21 Id. at 92 ("[I]f due care equals the socially optimal level, then injurers will be led to
choose both the socially optimal level of prior precautions and the socially optimal level of
care."); Schwartz, supra note 19, at 254-57, 259 (arguing that subjective negligence
standard generally results in underinvestment of precaution).
22 But see Charles R. Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective
Standards of Care in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REv. 285, 292-95 (2013) (making
this distinction, but not exploring full set of incentive effects due to two types of
personalization).
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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risk of harm." 24 The Third Restatement clarifies that its balancing
approach is identical to the reasonably careful person approach
"[b]ecause a 'reasonably careful person' . . . is one who acts with rea-
sonable care . . . ."25 The "reasonably careful person" standard is
explicitly objective and, therefore, nonpersonal.26 The law does not
generally ask whether a given person took as much care as she person-
ally ought to have taken, given the risk she creates and the risk reduc-
tion skills she has. Rather, it insists that individuals be judged
according to the standard of an external reasonable actor, repre-
senting some aggregate community measure.27
Objective standards do not mean one-size-fits-all. The present
objective regime permits some partition of the reference group against
which an actor's behavior is judged. While the partition does not go so
far as to personalize negligence law, courts have been willing to adjust
standards of care to account for several special human characteristics
that are thought to have a strong correlation with riskiness of actors
and with the effectiveness of their precautions. These characteristics,
discussed below, include inherently diminished physical and cognitive
capacity; enhanced special skills, intelligence, or knowledge; and doc-
tors and medical institutions with either enhanced or diminished
resources.
A. Diminished Capacity
Tort law treats several groups of people with diminished capacity
differently, applying a separate standard of care for each. These
groups include the physically disabled, children, and the mentally
disabled.
Physically Disabled. Actors with physical disabilities generally
face a standard of care in accordance with their condition: "The con-
duct of an actor with a physical disability is negligent only if the con-
duct does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the
24 Id. This wording indicates that the Restatement endorsed the Hand Formula for
determining negligence. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (determining liability on whether burden of adequate precautions is smaller than
multiplication of damages caused by their probability).
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
26 While the Restatement determines "reasonable care" by considering the objective
primary factors set out in § 3, considerations of more personal characteristics such as age
and knowledge are permitted for particular categories of cases. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 2010) (setting out certain categories of torts where more personalized factors
should be considered).
27 See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (N.J. 1959) ("[T]he standard of care is
the conduct of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances.").
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same disability." 2 8 For example, a blind or deaf person is only
required to take the contributory precautions reasonable in light of
her limitation. 29 This adjustment of the standard of care is often down-
ward. For example, required precautions for the blind or deaf do not
include looking or listening for a train at a railroad crossing.30 This is
consistent with what later in the Article we call skill-based personal-
ization: People whose skill in taking precautions is lower (or whose
private cost of taking precautions is higher) should optimally take less
care.3 ' But, the adjustment of standards may also go the opposite way,
raising the burden of precautions. A paralyzed driver whose physical
disability diminishes his control of the car might be required to take
additional precautionary measures that an able-bodied driver would
not be required to take, such as installing special steering mechanisms
or special brakes. 32 This is consistent with what later in the Article we
call the risk-based personalization: people whose conduct creates
higher risk should take more care.
Children. Children face standards of care distinct from, and gen-
erally lower than, those of adults: "A child's conduct is negligent if it
does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person of the same
age, intelligence, and experience . . .. "33 This, again, is consistent with
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
29 E.g., Muse v. Page, 4 A.2d 329, 331 (Conn. 1939) ("[R]easonable care in the case of
one with such defective vision as the plaintiff had is such care as an ordinarily prudent
person with a like infirmity would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.");
Fink v. City of New York, 132 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (ruling that deaf mute hit
by fire truck sounding its alarm is free from contributory negligence, having exercised
necessary due care allowed by his affliction).
30 See, e.g., Iron Mountain R.R. Co. v. Dies, 41 S.W. 860, 862 (Tenn. 1897) ("These
obligations to stop and look and listen [before going over the tracks of a railroad] must
receive a reasonable construction and interpretation. . . . [A party] cannot be required to
listen if he is deaf . . . .").
31 A related justification is that adjustment of the standard of care affords people with
physical disabilities some security in living their daily lives. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 119,
at 282 (noting that in some cases the rule is "especially protective of persons with
disabilities or physical limitations"); see also Avihay Dorfman, Negligence and
Accommodation: On Taking Others as They Really Are 12-13 (Dec. 27, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/avihay-dorfman/18/ (noting that cases
in which physical disadvantage warranted watered-down standard of care were cases of
contributory or comparative negligence, whereas cases concerning conduct of tortfeasors
did not make allowance for her physical disability).
32 While the law does not require sighted individuals to use seeing eye dogs or canes to
navigate public walkways, a blind person who fails to do so and is injured can be
considered contributorily negligent. See, e.g., Poyner v. Loftus, 694 A.2d 69, 71-72 (D.C.
1997).
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 10(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also, e.g., Hoyt v. Rosenberg, 182 P.2d 234, 236
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) ("While a minor, like an adult, is required to exercise ordinary
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skill-based personalization: "A child may be so young as to be mani-
festly incapable of exercising any of those qualities of attention, intel-
ligence and judgment which are necessary to enable him to perceive a
risk and to realize its unreasonable character." 34 This adjustment is
more finely personalized: If the child has different intelligence and
experience than children of comparable age, the standard would be
further adjusted. It could shift upwards: "[A] child who has not yet
attained his majority may be as capable as an adult."35 And it can shift
downwards if a child of a given age is demonstrably less capable than
his or her peers-perhaps because of immaturity or other develop-
mental delays.36
Mentally disabled. In general, tort law makes no allowance for
mental disability or insanity: "An actor's mental or emotional disa-
bility is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent,
unless the actor is a child."37 But in one specific area, standards of
care may be adjusted downwards for mentally disabled individuals.
This is in determining whether a mentally disabled plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent.38 Lowering the standard of contributory care for
care he is only required to exercise that degree or amount of care that is ordinarily
exercised by one of like age, experience and development.").
34 Lutteman v. Martin, 135 A.2d 600, 602-03 (Conn. C.P. 1957).
35 Id. at 603. For example, children are often held to a higher standard of care, similar
to that of adults, when performing what are considered "adult activities" such as driving an
automobile or operating a snowmobile. See; e.g., Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863
(Minn. 1961) ("While minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with
age, experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age,
experience, and wisdom, . . . in the operation of an automobile, airplane, or powerboat, a
minor is . . . held to the same standard of care as an adult."). Bernstein's view is that by
partaking in such activity, a child "assume[s] the combination of selected risks, pleasures,
and accountability that characterizes autonomous adult life" and therefore 'must
accept . . . the rigors of adult-level reasonable care." Anita Bernstein, The Communities
that Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 759 (2002).
36 See Soledad v. Lara, 762 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. App. 1988) ("[T]he fact that a child is
mentally retarded, or that he is unusually bright for his years is to be taken into account.").
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166
(Colo. 1961) (quoting 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 122 (1936)) ("The general rule is that an
insane person may be liable for his torts the same as a sane person, except perhaps those in
which malice and, therefore, intention are necessary ingredients."); Burch v. Am. Family
Mut. Ins., 543 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Wis. 1996) ("[A] tortfeasor's mental capacity cannot be
invoked to bar civil liability for negligence.").
38 See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake Cty., 771 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1989) (noting that "[i]n
contrast to the use of an objective standard in cases of primary negligence, the majority of
courts have adopted a more compassionate stance regarding the contributory negligence of
the mentally impaired," specifically that "[t]hose who are insane are incapable of
contributory negligence, whereas lesser degrees of mental impairment should be
considered by the jury in determining whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent");
Snider v. Callahan, 250 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1966) ("[W]ith respect to
contributory negligence, in Missouri and in many other states a subjective standard is
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mentally disabled victims shifts greater liability and cost of precaution
to their negligent injurers, and relieves these victims of some of the
losses they would have otherwise had to bear. Adjusting the standard
of care of the mentally disabled victim-but not the injurer-is a man-
ifestation of the idea (also embedded in the egg-shell skull principle39)
that the defendant "takes the victim as she finds him." 40
It is something of a mystery why tort law treats the mentally dis-
abled differently from the physically disabled and children. One pos-
sible justification is evidentiary: it is relatively easy to determine
physical disability and the age of a child but relatively difficult to
verify the specific effects of mental illness. 41 This justification ignores
the fact that the law takes a highly granular approach to determining
standards of care for children, including their mental development
(but perhaps children are less likely to bluff cognitive impairment in
legal proceedings). It also runs against the increased accuracy of psy-
chiatric diagnosis 42 that might improve the abilities to assess the skills
and riskiness of a defendant alleged to be mentally disabled. Another
justification for the reluctance to personalize standards of care for the
mentally disabled is that doing so would hurt the incentives of their
caretakers.43 But this justification, if it has any force, should apply
even more strongly to children than it does to mentally disabled
applied to children and persons suffering from a mental deficiency."). See generally Joseph
P. Flynn, Note, Contributory Negligence of Incompetents, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 215 (1964)
(discussing case law examples of contributory negligence by mentally ill tortfeasors).
39 See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891) ("The rule of damages in
actions for torts . . . [is] that the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from
the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him.").
40 See Dorfman, supra note 31, at 33-34 (justifying asymmetrical measurement of
reasonable care across defendant/plaintiff divide by notion that tortfeasors should take
potential victims as they find them).
41 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that limited or moderate mental
disorders, as opposed to psychoses, are disregarded partly due to "the problems of
administrability that would be encountered in attempting to identify them and assess their
significance"); cf David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in
Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 17, 29 (1981) (differentiating between the reasonable expectations of a
plaintiff facing a minor to those of one facing a mentally disabled defendant, and arguing
that "to give the [defendant] the benefit of the less demanding standard, when the
[plaintiff] has no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the first actor's impairment, would
impose on the [plaintiff]").
42 See Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 35 (1995) ("The task [of distinguishing between legitimate and spurious
defenses] may be simpler now than when this rationale was first offered, given the
increased accuracy of psychiatric diagnosis under the new Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM-III-R) and the modem recognition of physiological indicators of mental
disorders." (footnote omitted)).
43 Id. at 29-30 (presenting and refuting caretaker incentive justification).
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adults. Children are more likely to be under the direct supervision of a
caretaker who could take supervisory care. And yet children's stan-
dards are adjusted downwards, effectively exempting their caregivers
from the onus of step-in care, while the same forgiving standards are
denied for the mentally disabled.
B. Elevated Capacity
In an apparent asymmetry, tort law principles allow courts to take
into account elevated capacity more broadly than diminished capacity.
First, elevated capacity is relevant generally as a category and is not
limited to a closed list of cases. Thus, "[i]f an actor has skills or knowl-
edge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or
knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in determining
whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful person." 44
Second, elevated capacity is relevant not only when it is inherent, but
also when it is deliberately acquired.45 However, in practice this prin-
ciple of elevated capacity is applied inconsistently. For example,
courts have been willing to account for certain kinds of special skill-
like medical training 46-while ignoring others-like professional skill
as a driver.47
Defendant's special skills are most often taken into account in
cases where the defendant's profession is relevant to the injury. For
example, doctors are held to a standard of care for their patients that
is considerably higher than the reasonable person standard.48 The
same is true (although this varies across jurisdictions), 49 for example,
44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
45 See, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 653, 659 (Mass. 1978) (holding
hockey coach to higher standard of care due to his substantial experience and knowledge).
46 See Martinez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. F056592, 2010 WL 625838, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 24, 2010) (finding material issue of fact as to whether highway patrol officer was
negligent for having carelessly extracted accident victim from car, taking into account "that
[the officer] had received medical training and recertification as an [Emergency Medical
Responder] at the CHP, and that his training would have included teaching patient
assessment related to C-spine precautions").
47 See, e.g., Capital Raceway Promotions, Inc. v. Smith, 322 A.2d 238, 246-47 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974) (affirming trial court's instruction not to hold professional race car driver
to higher standard of care).
48 See Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 2006) ("[A] specialist should be
held to the standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession . . .
[practicing] the specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession." (first
alteration in original) (quoting Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968))).
49 For example, in Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1037-39 (Wyo. 1983), the court
refused to hold a professional truck driver with over ten years of truck driving experience
to a higher standard of care. See also State v. Robbins, 246 P.3d 864, 867 (Wyo. 2011)
(reaffirming ruling in Cervelli).
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of architects, physical therapists, and engineers.50 Even construction
workers have been held to a standard of care that reflects their famili-
arity with heavy machinery.51
It is unclear to what extent tailored standards based upon profes-
sional experiences are personalized within the profession. For
example, in medical malpractice, the law requires care commensurate
with the "average qualified practitioner." 5 2 But the level of care to
which a doctor is held-the "average" against which the doctor is
evaluated-varies quite a bit by specialty. Specialists are held to a
higher standard when treating an illness that falls within their pur-
view. 53 Some courts have gone even further, holding that, whatever
the medical standard of care is, each individual doctor is required to
make decisions to the best of her own judgment, when the doctor has
superior knowledge, skill, or intelligence in reducing risks inherent to
a common practice. 54
Considerations of special skill, knowledge, and intelligence are,
for the most part, a one-way street. While all courts are willing, in a
variety of circumstances, to raise standards of care above the level of
the "reasonable person" for individuals with enhanced capacity, they
refuse to decrease standards of care for individuals with lower-than-
average skill, knowledge, or intelligence55 (with the exceptions, as we
saw, of children, physically disabled, and sometimes mentally disabled
victims 5 6 ). Part of our goal in Parts II and III below is to offer a pos-
sible rationale for this asymmetric personalization regime.
50 See, e.g., Simon v. Drake Constr. Co., 621 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(architects); Rehab. Care Sys. of Am. v. Davis, 73 S.W.3d 233, 234 (Tex. 2002) (physical
therapists); Affiliated FM Ins. v. LTK Consulting Servs., 243 P.3d 521, 529 (Wash. 2010)
(en banc) (engineers).
51 See Hill v. Sparks, 546 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (ruling that earth
moving machine operator was negligent for failing to warn decedent "[d]espite his
knowledge and experience").
52 Palandjian, 842 N.E.2d at 920-21.
53 See supra note 48.
54 Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (N.Y. 1968) ("[A]
physician should use his best judgment and whatever superior knowledge, skill and
intelligence he has. Thus, a specialist may be held liable where a general practitioner may
not." (citation omitted)).
55 See, e.g., Stevens v. Fleming, 777 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Idaho 1989) (plurality opinion)
("Individual inexperience is not a legitimate reason for a lower standard of conduct.");
Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1046 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[The defendant]'s
inexperience or lack of knowledge cannot excuse his actions if the jury finds that the
reasonable person would have acted differently in his place."); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTs: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 12 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 2010) ("The fact that a person is below average in judgment, knowledge, or
skills is generally ignored in considering whether the person is negligent . . .
56 See supra Section I.A.




Precautions are costly, and individuals face different resource
constraints that vary the level of care they can optimally satisfy. While
in general negligence law resources do not matter in setting the stan-
dards of care,57 in medical malpractice law they do.
We saw that doctors are generally required to provide care that is
at least as good as the average qualified medical practitioner, perhaps
adjusted upwards to account for personal expertise. But what is the
reference group from which the average qualification is derived? One
dimension of reference is geographical. Traditionally, medical mal-
practice law has taken as the relevant reference the practices of other
doctors from the same locality as the doctor under scrutiny.58 More
recently, reference groups have been broadened to include similar
localities, either across the state or across the country59 (an expansion
designed to prevent groups of small-town doctors from shielding
themselves from liability by collectively refusing to update methods of
care to conform to modern practices 60).
Such regional variations in the standard of care are certainly a
partial response to perceived variances in levels of physician skill or
knowledge.61 But, they are also explicit responses to variations in
medical resources. As one court explained, "[i]n applying this stan-
dard it is permissible to consider the medical resources available to
the physician .... [S]ome allowance is thus made for the type of com-
munity in which the physician carries on his practice." 62
57 Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 428
(1992). Arlen opposes this notion, arguing that under the assumption that individuals are
risk averse, optimal deterrence requires an account of wealth differences. Id. at 419-27.
For a discussion regarding the possible usage of information concerning wealth in the
design of negligence standards, see infra Section IV.B.4.
58 See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 244, at 635 & n.1 (discussing rule's origin in Small v.
Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880)).
59 See, e.g., Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hosps., 528 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Mich. 1995) ("[T]he
standard of care for general practitioners is that of the local community or similar
communities, and is nationwide for a specialist." (footnote omitted)).
60 See, e.g., Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (Wash. 1967) ("The fact that
several careless practitioners might settle in the same place cannot affect the standard of
diligence and skill which local patients have a right to expect. Negligence cannot be
excused on the ground that others in the same locality practice the same kind of
negligence.").
61 See, e.g., Geraty v. Kaufman, 162 A. 33, 36 (Conn. 1932) ("[W]e recognize that a
country surgeon should not be expected to exercise the high degree of skill possessed by
eminent surgeons living in large cities and making a specialty of surgical operations.").
62 Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
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Resource-based adjustments in standards of care apply to hospi-
tals, as well.63 Hospitals serving smaller communities may not be
asked to maintain the same medical equipment as their larger neigh-
bors, even if such absence means lower care. Interestingly, such con-
siderations can be relevant even where the hospital's alleged
negligence is not in the provision of medical treatment. If, for
example, the hospital applies only limited security and supervision,
enabling a patient to escape the hospital and later suffer due to lack of
proper treatment, the hospital's resources are deemed relevant. 6 4 In
one such case, the court held that "[tihe protection of patients is not a
medical function of a hospital; rather, it is a service provided by a
hospital to its patients, and the ability of a small rural hospital to pro-
vide such a service is limited by its location and resources." 6 5
D. Personalization Through Insurance?
Insurance is another mechanism by which personalized standards
of care may emerge. When potential injurers purchase liability insur-
ance, the premiums they pay are tailored to the risks they create. Any
information that insurers have about factors affecting these risks-
including injurers' skills and riskiness-would be reflected in the pre-
mium. For example, auto liability insurance would offer discounts to
drivers whose known characteristics are correlated with low risk (such
as high grades in college) or with high skill (driving experience).
If insurers were able to observe the precautions injurers take and
adjust premiums accordingly, would insurance policies incentivize
injurers to adopt personalized levels of care, reflecting their idiosyn-
cratic traits? Could insurance therefore substitute for the tort system
by privately regulating a personalized standard regime? 66
The idea that insurance can promote personalized care is intui-
tive, and it seems consistent with ways in which insurance personalizes
policy premiums according to risk. Insurance is the business of data
sorting, and it is indeed at the forefront of personalized underwriting.
For example, insurers install "telematics" devices in cars and collect
data about driving patterns, thereby fine tuning the premiums that
63 See Johnson v. Wills Mem'1 Hosp. & Nursing Home, 343 S.E.2d 700, 702 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986) (applying locality rule in wrongful death action against small rural hospital with
limited resources).
6 See id. at 701-02.
65 Id. at 702.
66 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MIcH. L. REV. 197, 220 (2012) (examining ways in
which insurance regulates standards of safety).
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drivers pay.6 7 But perhaps surprisingly, insurance is not going to be
effective in personalizing the safety measures and care levels that poli-
cyholders adopt.
Insurers set premiums according to what they predict to be the
expected liability of the policyholder-this is the payout that they
would have to make under the liability coverage. Since the expected
liability depends on the standards set by tort law, the premiums
insurers charge would merely reflect the uniform standards prevailing
under the legal system. Even if the insured-injurer is high skill or high
risk, and should ideally take a high level of care, the insurer has no
reason to create incentives to take more than an average level of care.
Requiring policyholders to do more than is required by law would not
lead to lower premiums, and thus policyholders would reject such
policies.
What about policyholders with low skills or with low risks?
Would insurers incentivize them to take the personalized and optimal
level of care, which is less than the legally required uniform level? No.
Here, too, insurers would not go any further than inducing the care
levels that injurers would take absent insurance, under a uniform stan-
dard of care. Under such a regime, as we will explain below, injurers
have the incentive to meet the uniform standard of care and bear no
liability. Inducing people to take lower than the required level of care
would only expose insurers to liability coverage. 68
Our brief survey demonstrates the existence of some personaliza-
tion in negligence law. This is only crude personalization, partitioning
the population of injurers into subgroups that, as a general approxi-
mation, have different skills or a different degree of riskiness.69 Some-
times it is more finely done, as in the case of children, where the
courts are willing to look at their individual developmental stage. We
also saw that personalization is, in professional cases, unidirectional:
67 See TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., PAY-As-You-DRIVE
INSURANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 7 (2011), http://www.vtpi.org/
payd-rec.pdf (describing use of GPS transponders installed in cars to price insurance
policies based on location and time driven); Chris Woodyard, Drivers May Lower
Insurance Premiums by Getting Monitored, USA TODAY (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:23 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2011-03-14-Progressive-electronic-check-system.htm
(discussing such a program implemented by Progressive Insurance).
68 Later, we explain that under certain assumptions low-skill or low-risk injurers will
self-personalize under a uniform standard of care, i.e., take a low level of care and pay
damages. See infra Section II.A.3. Insurance coverage would not change injurers' incentive
to self-personalize.
69 For a theoretical analysis of the role of subgroups in negligence law and their relation
to objective and subjective standards, see Bernstein, supra note 35.
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Only higher but not lower skills, knowledge, and experience are taken
into account in setting the standards of care. Hence, while tort law
seems open to the idea of personalization of standards of care, its pro-
gress thus far in that direction has been, at best, partial and
inconsistent.
II
THE EFFICIENCY OF PERSONALIZED STANDARDS
Part I presented the law of negligence as a system of uniform
standards. Some pockets of personalization are recognized, but they
are the exception, not the rule. We now turn to the core of the
Article-the normative comparison between uniform and personal-
ized standards. In this Part, our yardstick is efficiency. Later, in Part
III, we analyze personalization from both corrective and distributive
justice perspectives. Our analysis in this Part compares uniform and
personalized standards along several dimensions: the efficiency of the
levels of care and levels of activity of injurers, the efficiency of victims'
care, and the effect on injurers' ex ante investments in reducing their
harmfulness. Along each of these dimensions, we examine the two
types of personalization-skill-based and risk-based-and demon-
strate their centrality to any analysis of personalization.
Throughout this Part, we present our claims through analysis of a
simple numerical example. Most of the insights arising from this
example are general. When necessary, we expand the analytical
framework beyond the simple setting.
A. Levels of Care
Assume that injurers can each take precautions that reduce the
probability of accident, but not its magnitude. Suppose, for simplicity,
that these individuals interact with potential victims and may cause a
harm of $100 to a victim. The effectiveness of precautions for a "rep-
resentative" injurer is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Probability of Expected Social
Level of Care Cost of Care Harm Cost
Low $6 22% $28
Medium $16 10% $26*
High $26 2% $28
* Lowest social cost.
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Looking at the "Expected Social Cost" column in Table 1, we see
that the lowest social cost is realized when the injurer takes "medium"
care. Without more information on the specific competence of each
potential injurer, the optimal uniform standard of care should be
"medium," imposing an average cost of $16 on all potential injurers.
The expected social cost would be $26.
But now suppose that injurers are heterogeneous and that the
numbers in Table 1 are merely averages. Assume that the court has
reliable information about idiosyncratic traits of the injurer-
defendant, and that this information fits one of two categories. The
first category is information on the "skill" that the injurer has in
reducing risks-how costly it is for the injurer to meet each level of
care in Table 1. The second category is information about the riskiness
of each injurer-the likelihood at any precaution level that the harm
would happen. Let's examine what the best use of such information is.
1. Skill-Based Personalization
The simplest way to capture the idea that injurers have different
risk-reduction skills is to vary the cost they have to incur in order to
reach each of the three discrete levels of care-low, medium, and
high. More skilled injurers can achieve the same reduction in risk as
unskilled injurers by spending less on care.70 For example, some
drivers are more competent in operating sophisticated technical
equipment and therefore can more effectively reduce risks with such
equipment; some doctors are more experienced than other doctors
and therefore can more quickly and cheaply diagnose certain patients.
It is possible, of course, that the same injurer would be skillful with
one type of precaution and unskillful with another type of precaution.
That should affect her choices not only as to the level of care with a
certain precaution, but also as to the specific type of precaution she
takes. Personalization, in other words, is both qualitative as well as
quantitative. In our analysis below, for simplicity, we focus only on the
quantitative aspect: For any particular type of precaution, how should
the level be set across different injurers?
We can assume that there is a spectrum of skill, ranging between
the highest- and lowest-skilled injurers. Relative to the representative
injurer depicted in Table 1, the highest-skilled injurer can spend 50%
less at each level of care to obtain the same risk reduction, whereas
70 Schwartz illustrates this point by presenting a graph which compares the marginal
cost curve of taking care for a blind person alongside a similar graph for a sighted person.
The ensuing conclusion is that as the former bears higher costs for each level of care, it is
efficient for him to take less care. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 243. For a different
graphical illustration of this argument, see Korsmo, supra note 22, at 309-10.
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the lowest-skilled injurer must spend 50% more at each level of care.
Table 2 summarizes the precaution choices for these two extreme
types of injurers (which we label "skilled" and "unskilled").
TABLE 2
Level Cost of Care Probability Expected Social Cost
of Care Skilled Unskilled of Harm Skilled Unskilled
Low $3 $9 22% $25 $31*
Medium $8 $24 10% $18 $34
High $13 $39 2% $15* $41
*Lowest social costs.
Notice that the average of skilled and unskilled injurers yields
exactly the representative injurer depicted in Table 1. If the standard
is set uniformly for all injurers irrespective of their skill-what we call
a uniform standard regime-the most efficient level would be
"medium," and the social cost would be $26. But society can do better.
If the standard is set in a personalized manner, it would vary across
injurer types. Looking at the "Expected Social Cost" dual columns in
Table 2, we see the lowest cost is obtained when the skilled injurer
takes "high" care and the unskilled injurer takes "low" care.7 ' Instead
of requiring all injurers to take "medium" care, as prescribed under
the uniform standard regime, the law can differentiate the standard of
care according to the skill of the injurers and reduce the expected
social costs. If, for example, there are equal numbers of skilled and
unskilled injurers, the expected social cost will be $23 (the average of
$15 and $31, the lowest attainable social costs for skilled and unskilled
injurers, respectively)-lower than under a uniform standard regime
($26).72
71 It is assumed, for now, that under the uniform standard regime the low-skilled
injurer abides by the medium standard of care. This assumption will be revisited, and the
resulting discussion refined, below. See infra Section II.A.3.
72 More generally, if injurers' skill varies along a continuum, anywhere between the
+50% and -50% range (all relative to the representative injurer depicted in Table 1) there
is a threshold of care cost above which an injurer's standard of care should be scaled down
to "low," and another threshold of care cost below which an injurer's standard of care
should be scaled up to "high." To determine the thresholds, we look for multiples of the
cost of care, a and b, such that low care and high care become more efficient than medium
care:
(1 + a)6 + 0.22 x 100 < (1 + a)16 + 0.10 x 100;
(1 + b)26 + 0.02 x 100 < (1 + b)16 + 0.10 x 100.
This yields a > 20% and b < -20%. When the skill level of the injurer is sufficiently low
that the cost of taking each level of care rises by more than 20% or more relative to the
average injurer, the standard of care should be adjusted downwards; and when the skill is
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It is possible that the standards injurers face could be further
refined, applying more than two high/low adjustments. Following the
same logic, this would generate even greater precaution efficiency.
The practical implementation burdens of such continuous personaliza-
tion will be discussed in Part IV.
The observation that skill-based personalization is more efficient
than a uniform standard is wholly intuitive. It pays to impose higher
burdens on the more competent actors to take advantage of their
greater productivity. Thus, the driver who is more competent in oper-
ating sophisticated technical equipment should probably use it, while
the less competent driver perhaps should not.73 Similarly, the exper-
ienced doctor who can diagnose a patient in minutes, but who failed to
do so, should be considered negligent, while a less experienced doctor,
who needs much more time to diagnose a patient and failed to do so,
perhaps should not be considered negligent (assuming, in both cases,
that the doctor has a small amount of time to invest in each patient
because of a sudden overload of work).
But a less intuitive aspect is the effect of personalized standards
on the overall costs imposed on differently skilled injurers. Personal-
ized standards, although imposing more differentiated levels of care,
impose less differentiated costs of care on the various types of
injurers. Under uniform standards, the skilled and unskilled injurers
have to take the same level of care ("medium"), but they bear differ-
entiated costs of $8 and $24, respectively, to satisfy it. Under personal-
ized standards, they have to take different levels of care. The skilled
injurer has to take "high" care but can do so relatively cheaply and
incurs a cost of $13. The unskilled injurer has to take "low" care but in
a relatively expensive manner and incurs a cost of $9. This illustrates a
general point: Skill-based personalization counteracts people's une-
qual skills, offsetting the high cost of compliance with scaled-down
standards. 7 4
sufficiently high that the cost of taking each level of care falls by more than 20% or more
relative to the average injurer, the standard of care should be adjusted upwards.
73 Korsmo criticizes the concept that unskilled injurers should take less care, ergo act in
a less prudent fashion. This theoretically sound notion, he argues, may lead to absurd
results. See Korsmo, supra note 22, at 316-17 ("The assumptions of the Standard Model
actually suggest that unskilled drivers should be allowed to drive faster than skilled drivers.
They suggest that unskilled drivers should be allowed to engage in more distractions than
the skilled.... Something is evidently amiss with the Standard Model, when translated into
actual legal prescriptions.").
74 For further discussion of this last point, see infra Section III.B.1.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 2016]1 649
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. Risk-Based Personalization
Assume now that injurer types vary according to a different attri-
bute: the riskiness of their conduct. For the same level of care, "safe"
injurers create lower risk than "risky" injurers. For example, some
drivers create higher risks on the road, even when driving at the same
speed, because they have poor instincts or inferior driving abilities rel-
ative to other drivers; some doctors create higher risks in performing
medical procedures, even when they use the same tools and proce-
dures, because they are less experienced and knowledgeable than
other doctors. Note that experience and knowledge in some occasions,
and for some tools and procedures, might affect skillfulness, as we
demonstrated in the previous section, but in other occasions, and for
some other tools and procedures, might affect riskiness. Thus, when
injurers lack experience or knowledge with respect to a certain precau-
tion, they should often be required to meet lower standards of care
with respect to that specific precaution. That lack of experience or
knowledge, however-namely, the low skill in taking certain precau-
tions-makes these injurers more risky and requires them to take
other alternative precautions, as we explain below.75
Again, we assume that injurers' riskiness is distributed randomly,
anywhere on a continuum between safe and risky. Specifically, rela-
tive to the representative injurer, safe injurers impose a risk that is
50% lower, whereas risky injurers impose a risk 50% higher.76 Table 3
summarizes the care choices for the safest and for the most risky
injurers.
75 See infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
76 It should be noted that variation according to risk of harm could be captured also as
variation according to cost of care. If care is defined as the cost to achieve a given
reduction in the probability of accident, then the two attributes-skill and riskiness-
would be synonymous. Thus, presenting the case of personalization according to risk of
harm does not add a new theoretical insight, but merely replicates the effect described in
the case of personalization according to cost of care. It is present here, nevertheless, in
order to set the stage for the legal applications. The mathematical similarities between the
two forms of variations have been noted in previous writings on the topic. See SHAVELL,
supra note 17, at 73 ("[R]eference will be made, for simplicity, only to differences in
parties' cost of taking care, although what will be said will plainly bear equally on
differences in the effectiveness of their exercise of care."); Korsmo, supra note 22, at 292
("From a purely mathematical perspective, the distinction between the two scenarios is,
indeed, seemingly inconsequential."). Korsmo nevertheless devotes a significant portion of
his article to an analysis of the differences between the two variations, and suggests a
method for determining which one should be applied. See id. at 319-37.




Level Cost of Care Probability Expected Social Cost
of Care Safe Risky of Harm Safe Risky
Low $6 11% 33% $17* $39
Medium $16 5% 15% $21 $31
High $26 1% 3% $27 $29*
* Lowest social costs.
Notice again that the average of safe and risky injurers yields
exactly the representative injurer depicted in Table 1. But the optimal
personalized standards are different than the uniform standard. The
lowest social cost is obtained when safe injurers take "low" care and
risky injurers take "high" care.77 Relative to the most efficient uni-
form standard ("medium"), social costs are reduced. If, for example,
injurers are either safe or risky with equal likelihood, the expected
social cost under a personalized standards regime will be $23 (the
average of $17 and $29)-lower than under a uniform standards
regime ($26).
Notice, also, that in terms of the distribution of burdens, we get
an opposite effect to the one we saw under skill-based personalization.
Risk-based personalized standards impose more differentiated costs
on the different types of injurers than uniform standards. Under uni-
form standards, the safe and risky types bear the same cost of $16 to
meet the "medium" standard of care. Under personalized standards,
they have to bear costs of $6 and $26, respectively.78
The main result arising from Table 3-that injurers who create
lower risks should take lower care-is intuitive.79 It pays to impose
higher burdens on the more risky actors since any additional burden
77 More generally, if injurers' riskiness varies anywhere between the +50% and -50%
range, there is a threshold of riskiness above which the injurer's standard of care should be
scaled up to "high," and another threshold of riskiness below which the injurer's standard
of care should be scaled down to "low." To determine the thresholds, we look for multiples
of the probability of harm, s and t, such that low care and high care become more efficient
than medium care:
6 + (1 + s)0.22 x 100 < 16 + (1 + s)0.10 x 100;
26 + (1 + t)0.02 x 100 < 16 + (1 + t)0.10 x 100.
This yields s < -0.167 and t > 0.25. When the probability of harm at every level of care is
scaled down by more than 16.7% or more relative to the representative injurer, the
standard of care should be adjusted downwards; and when the probability of harm is scaled
up by more than at least 25%, the standard of care should be adjusted upwards.
78 For further discussion of this last point, see infra Section III.B.1.
79 Korsmo illustrates this point by presenting a graph showing the accident costs for
each level of care for both the skilled and unskilled injurers. As the former's costs are
lower, they intersect with the ascending precaution costs at an earlier stage, leading to the
conclusion that skilled injurers should take less care. See Korsmo, supra note 22, at 323-24.
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would produce more risk reduction for the high-risk actor than for the
low-risk actor. Thus, the high-risk driver with the poor instincts should
take more care than the driver with the sharper instincts. Similarly,
the high-risk doctor with less experience and knowledge should take
more care than the more experienced and knowledgeable doctor.
Our conclusion, that the less experienced and knowledgeable
doctor or driver should take more care, does not contradict the pre-
vious claim that such doctor, being less skillful, should take less care.
There are two ways to reconcile these conflicting findings. The first is
by recognizing that care and precautions have multiple dimensions,
and thus the conflicting conclusions apply to different dimensions of
care. A doctor should take a low level of the type of precautions that
she is unskillful in deploying. That, in turn, makes her relatively riskier
and justifies imposing upon her a higher level of care with respect to
other precautions. The second way to reconcile the conflicting findings
is to view them as "all else equal" effects, each pulling in a different
direction. The overall net effect would then be the combination of the
two forces. If, for example, only one type of precaution is available, a
driver who is both riskier and low skill may in the end be required to
take either a higher or lower level of care, depending on which effect
dominates. It is therefore possible that despite the low skill in
applying this single-dimensional precaution, the high-risk driver may
be required after all to take a higher level of care.
3. Self-Personalization
The reason uniform standards are not as efficient as personalized
standards is the incentive they provide injurers to abide even by ineffi-
cient standards of care. Injurers have this incentive because of what is
known as the "discontinuity" feature of negligence law: that the
failure to meet the standard-even a small margin of departure-
would give rise to full liability for the entire harm suffered by the
victim.s0 Thus, even when injurers recognize the standard to be inef-
ficiently tailored to their skill or riskiness, as the uniform standard
would often be, they nevertheless abide by it and incur inefficient pre-
caution costs, to avoid the even greater lump sum liability.
There is, however, an important caveat to this "discontinuity"
feature. If failure to meet the standard of care results only in incre-
80 This discontinuity and its behavioral consequences were originally explained by
Robert D. Cooter. Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 79, 80-89 (1982). Cooter later explained that this discontinuity is due to
incomplete information available to the courts or the probabilistic nature of the causal
connection. Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?,
40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1989).
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mental liability-only for the additional harm due to the gap between
actual care and the legal standard of care-the incentive to abide by
an inefficient standard of care is attenuated. An injurer might prefer
to disregard the standard and assume such incremental liability. Such
an injurer would take efficient care and pay a little extra in liability.,,
Accordingly, the distortion arising from uniform standards is not as
large as our analysis above stated, and the benefit of shifting to per-
sonalized standards is correspondingly smaller. 82 Nevertheless, and
despite the self-correcting mechanism of injurers ignoring inefficient
uniform standards, we now show that such self-correction will not
always occur and therefore personalized standards continue to have a
systematic efficiency advantage.
Consider, first, skill-based variation among injurers. We saw that
skill-based personalized standards would require unskilled injurers to
take "low" care and the high-skilled injurers to take "high" care, and
we argued that these are improvements relative to the "medium" care
that all injurers take under the uniform standards regime. But would
injurers indeed abide by the "medium" care standard under a uniform
standards regime?
Not necessarily. To be sure, skilled injurers would. For them, the
"medium" care standard is a boon. It is cheaper than the more effi-
cient "high" care personalized standard. The skilled injurers would be
delighted to qualify for a liability safe harbor by investing less than
efficiently. But unskilled injurers would have a different incentive.
They would choose to disregard the inefficiently burdensome
"medium" standard, even if this means that they would be found
liable. Returning to Table 2, the unskilled injurers, taking the efficient
"low" level of care at a cost of $9 would create some exposure to
liability. But not for all harms: They would be liable only for harms
81 Mark Grady and Marcel Kahan have demonstrated that the discontinuity of liability,
as well as the risk of burdening the negligent injurer with liability for more than the harm
he caused, completely disappears when causation rules are properly applied so that the
injurer is liable only for those harms that would not have been created had he behaved
reasonably. Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J.
799, 812-13 (1983); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the
Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 428-29 (1989).
82 Landes and Posner were the first to note that under a uniform standard of care rule,
injurers with very high costs of taking care would not comply with the uniform standard
but choose instead the standard of care which is efficient for them. LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 16, at 125. Schwartz furthers this notion by dividing the group of high-cost
injurers who choose not to comply with the uniform standard into two subgroups: one
which chooses to engage in the activity and one which refrains from doing so, as the
benefits it derives are exceeded by costs of care and costs of harm. Schwartz, supra note 19,
at 249-50. This result is viewed by Schwartz as an advantage for the uniform standard over
the subjective one, as it creates "self-enforcing incentives for optimal behavior in deciding
whether to engage in the activity." Id.
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that are due to the difference between taking "low" and "medium"
care. Since the shift from "medium" to "low" raises the expected
harm from $10 to $22, the expected liability of the unskilled injurers
who ignore the "medium" standard and take "low" care is only $12
(the difference between $22 and $10) and not $22 (as we previously
assumed). For them, taking "low" care at a cost of $9 and incurring
the expected liability of $12, for a total cost of $21, is cheaper than
incurring no liability by satisfying the "medium" care standard at a
cost of $24.
Here, the advantage of personalized standards is diminished
because some unskilled injurers would be self-driven to take the effi-
cient care level, even under a uniform standard. This is a general
observation: Any time the idiosyncratic cost of care to injurers is high
enough to justify a lower personalized standard, this injurer would
also have the incentive to ignore the uniform standard and take a
lower level of care. In other words, the unskilled injurer would always
self-personalize.83 The advantage of personalized standards is then
solely due to their effect on the upper side of the distribution of
injurers-the skilled injurers-who otherwise are happy to satisfy a
uniform standard, what is for them inefficiently low care.
The same one-sided self-personalization occurs in the case of
risk-based variations across injurers. Once we relax our assumption
that injurers abide by the standard of care, and instead assume that
injurers do what is less costly for them and that they bear incremental
liability (no "discontinuity"), then, again, some injurers will ignore the
inefficient uniform standard-they will self-personalize and behave
efficiently. Specifically, safe injurers will ignore what is for them an
inefficiently high uniform standard. Taking the personally efficient
"low" care, at a cost of $6, and bearing the expected liability of $6 (the
difference between the actual expected harm of $11 and the expected
harm of $5 that would have resulted had he abided by the required
"medium" standard of care) is less costly for the safe injurer than
incurring no liability by satisfying the "medium" care standard at a
cost of $16.8 Here, too, the advantage of personalized standards
83 More generally, in the numerical example of Table 2, unskilled injurers have an
incentive to self-personalize if: (1 + a)6 + (0.22 - 0.10) x 100 < (1 + a)16. Thus, anytime
unskilled injurers have a cost that is more than 20% higher than the representative injurer,
they would self-personalize and take "low" care. This, recall, is also the cost threshold that
justifies a reduction of the standard of care from "medium" to "low." We can conclude that
the incentive to self-personalize for the unskilled occurs if and only if it is efficient.
8 In a similar fashion, Korsmo argues that under the variation in which injurers differ
by riskiness, it is the less risky injurer who would find it too costly to adhere to the
reasonable person standard and would therefore abide by her lower subjective standard,
thereby creating a "pocket" of strict liability. See Korsmo, supra note 22, at 327-29.
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arises only from their effect on risky injurers. These risky types would
be content to meet the "medium" level of care required under the
uniform standards regime, rather than the costlier "high" level of care
under a personalized regime. Personalization corrects this distortion.
4. Summary
We examined the efficiency of shifting from uniform to personal-
ized standards in environments in which injurers vary across two
harm-relevant dimensions: skill in taking precautions and underlying
propensity to impose risks. There are other dimensions along which
standards can be differentiated (for example, the magnitude of harm),
but the discussion above already demonstrates several basic insights
that apply to all cases. First, differentiating the standards can improve
incentives for care. If information is available about the different risks
and prevention costs, and if injurers can anticipate the differentiated
standards they face, personalized standards are more efficient than
average standards.
Second, the examples above draw out some basic principles in the
design of personalized standards. Should injurers who impose a higher
expected harm face stiffer standards? Upon first reflection, one might
intuitively conjecture that such harmful injurers should always be con-
fronted with higher standards of care. The analysis shows, however,
that this intuition is only partially valid. We saw that risky injurers-
who impose higher probabilities of accidents at each level of care rela-
tive to safe injurers-should indeed face higher standards of care. But
we also saw an effect in the opposite direction: Unskilled injurers-
who impose a greater risk because they are less effective in taking
care and can only achieve accident prevention at higher cost-should
face lower, not higher, personalized standards relative to the skilled
injurers. Skilled injurers are less harmful but should nevertheless face
higher standards of care due to their relative effectiveness.
We also saw that personalized standards impose a different cost
of compliance on different types of injurers. Here, too, it might be
conjectured that the distribution of burdens would exhibit more vari-
ance under a personalized standards regime. But, again, this is not
always so. When injurers vary in their costs of care (skilled versus
unskilled), personalized standards can reduce, rather than increase,
the disparity in the burdens of compliance.
Finally, we examined the incentives of injurers to self-
personalize-a type of self-selection that might occur even under uni-
form standards, and might lead injurers to take differentiated levels of
care notwithstanding the crude, uniform legal standard. This would
happen only if we assume continuity-rather than discontinuity-of
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liability, namely, if we assume that failure to take the required level of
care exposes the injurer only to the incremental losses caused by this
failure, and not others. In this environment of self-personalization,
personalized standards continue to be more efficient, but solely due to
their effect in increasing the burden of care upon some injurers.
B. Levels of Activity
A standard result in the economic analysis of negligence law is
the activity-level distortion. When injurers conform to the standard of
care they bear only some of the full social cost of their activity (they
bear the cost of care but not the residual expected harm) and there-
fore engage in excessive levels of activity. 5 In this section we ask how
the activity-level distortion would be affected by personalized stan-
dards of care. We make two distinct observations. First, personalizing
the standard of care according to skill (but not risks) could further
distort, rather than improve, injurers' activity levels. Second, we iden-
tify a novel regime that combines both personalized and uniform stan-
dards, which improves both care and activity levels.
1. Improving or Distorting Levels of Activity
We saw in Section II.A above that the standard of care would
generally be higher the more skilled and risky the injurers are,
exceeding the average uniform standard for the upper half of the pop-
ulation of injurers. How would that affect their levels of activity?
Raising the standard of care for some injurers reduces their
activity-level distortion, while lowering it for others exacerbates this
distortion. In the example in Table 2, raising the standard for skilled
injurers from "medium" to "high" raises their cost of care from $8 to
$13. At "medium" care, the negative externality from their activity
was $10 (the expected harm which they do not have to bear). At
"high" care, the negative externality is only $2. Since it is this negative
externality that drives the activity-level distortion, shrinking it from an
absolute magnitude of $10 to $2 reduces the distortion.
While standards are raised for skilled injurers, they are lowered
for the unskilled types, from "medium" to "low" care. Here, the
activity-level distortion is aggravated. At "medium" care the negative
externality from the activity of the unskilled injurers was $10. At
"low" care, it was $22. As the externality rises from an absolute mag-
nitude of $10 to $22, the distortion grows.
Thus, under skill-based personalization, the unskilled are led to
engage in more undesirable activity, while the skilled are led to
85 SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 23-24.
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engage in less. Commentators have long noticed one side of this
result-the increasingly inefficient activity levels by the unskilled-
and invoked it as a primary argument against personalization. 86 If
people who cannot take effective care were only required to meet
their low personalized standard, others would be imperiled by the
greater risk they impose. The neighbors of the unskilled injurer, says
Holmes, "accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to
their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his
personal equation into account."87 But what they have not noticed is
the other side of the coin: the increasingly efficient activity levels by
the skilled injurer.
Still, in normal circumstances, the added inefficient risks posed by
the unskilled due to personalization more than offsets the improved
activity levels of skilled injurers.88 The reason is subtle. The activity
distortion is due to the expected harm that a standard-abiding injurer
does not bear. The more care an injurer takes, the lower this expected
harm, but the marginal reduction has a diminishing property. When
the unskilled injurer shifts from the uniform standard to the personal-
ized low care, the increase in expected harm is greater in absolute
value than the decrease that occurs when the skilled injurer shifts
from the uniform to the personalized high care. As a result, the
overall distortion of activity under skill-based personalized standards
increases.
But this is not the case under risk-based personalization. Here,
safe injurers take lower care and thus engage in more inefficient
activity (in our example in Table 3, they now create uncompensated
expected harm to victims of $11, up from $5 under uniform stan-
dards). But risky injurers take higher care and engage in less ineffi-
cient activity ($3 of uncompensated external harm, down from $15).
Because, all else equal, risky injurers create larger harms, the effect of
curbing their activity level more than offsets the increase in activity by
the safe injurers. As a result, the overall distortion of activity under
risk-based personalized standards decreases. Here, the desirable effect
86 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 126 (arguing that when a uniform
standard of care, as opposed to an individualized standard of care, is applied to a child,
who is unable to attain a high level of care, his parents are incentivized to prevent him
from driving); Schwartz, supra note 19, at 246 ("A rule that only requires the injurer to
take what is for her optimal care while engaging in the activity cannot achieve the optimal
result. Under such a rule, some injurers who should not engage in the activity will
nevertheless do so.").
87 HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108.
88 This was the case in our numerical example: The increased externality for the
unskilled injurer was $12, and the reduced externality for the skilled injurer was only $8.
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of personalization on activity levels adds to their effect on care levels
to bolster the efficiency of the regime.
2. Activity Levels with Self-Personalization
We concluded that personalized standards have a mixed effect on
activity levels. Relative to uniform standards, they produce two
effects. On the upside, personalized standards reduce the distortion in
activity levels for injurers who now face higher standards (skilled or
risky injurers). On the downside, they worsen the distortion for
injurers who now face lower standards (unskilled or safe injurers). We
now argue that the downside is actually smaller than what the analysis
above suggested.
Return to the environment in which injurers may self-personalize.
We showed in Section II.A.3 that under a uniform standard regime, in
which liability is only for harm caused by untaken care ("continuous"
liability), it would be rational for unskilled or safe injurers to ignore
the uniform standard ("medium") and take instead the personally effi-
cient care ("low"). In this setting, personalized standards have a
smaller distorting effect on activity levels. To see this, consider the
case of risk-based personalization. Under uniform standards, the safe
injurer's activity level would depend on whether he self-personalizes.
If he doesn't-if he abides by the uniform standard-he takes
"medium" care, he is not found liable, and thus incurs a private cost of
$16, and imposes an uncompensated expected harm of $5. If, instead,
the injurer does self-personalize and takes "low" care, he is found
liable for the incremental harms that would have been prevented had
he taken "medium" care, and thus incurs a private cost of $12 ($6 cost
of "low" care plus $6 expected liability), and imposes an uncompen-
sated expected harm of $5. This illustrates a general pattern: Self-per-
sonalization does not affect the size of the uncompensated harm the
injurer inflicts on victims ($5 either way), but it does reduce the
private cost of activity to the injurer. As a result, with self-
personalization, safe injurers (those whose private benefit is between
$12 and $16) engage in a higher activity level and inflict the
externality. 89
Thus, once we allow for the possibility of self-personalization
under uniform standards, activity level is higher than we initially cal-
culated. This should be obvious-the only reason the injurer self-
personalizes is to reduce the private cost of activity. This means that
moving to a regime of personalized standards imposes a smaller
89 The same analysis shows that with self-personalization, more unskillful injurers
engage in the activity and inflict the externality than without self-personalization.
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increase in the activity level of safe and unskilled injurers than we
otherwise calculated. The activity-level downside of personalization is
thus smaller.
3. A Hybrid Regime
Personalized standards have a downside: They bring about an
increase in the activity level of some injurers. Indeed, it is this concern
that led commentators to conclude that a uniform standards regime is
superior. 90 We now argue that this concern should not trump categori-
cally the case for personalized standards. A personalized standards
regime can be designed to apply only when it does not distort activity
levels. We show that an unambiguous improvement in both care and
activity can be obtained if personalization is done selectively.
Consider a "hybrid" regime in which each type of injurer faces a
standard that is the greater of the pure personalized standard and the
one-size-fits-all uniform standard. Personalization, in other words, can
only operate to increase, but not to decrease, the standard of care. In
the case of skill-based personalization (the example in Table 2), skilled
injurers face the "high" standard (the higher among {high,
medium}-the optimal personalized and the optimal uniform stan-
dards), whereas unskilled injurers face the "medium" standard (the
higher among {low, medium}). Under this hybrid regime, skilled
injurers would take more efficient care and activity levels than they
would under a pure uniform standards regime; and unskilled injurers
would take the same care and activity levels as they would under a
uniform standard regime. This regime is generally better than uniform
standards, due to the improvement in care and activity by the skilled
type. The same logic applies to the case of risk-based standardization:
Under the hybrid regime, the risky injurer will be required to meet a
high standard, while the safe injurer will be required to adhere to a
medium standard.
C. Victim Care
In this section we examine how personalization of injurers' stan-
dards of care affects the efficiency of victim precaution. We assume,
for the purpose of this discussion, that victims are homogeneous. To
be sure, victims vary in many ways as well, which could also justify
personalization of standards of contributory care. The question in this
section, however, is different. Does the case for personalization of
injurers' standards depend on its effect on victims' behavior?
90 SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 91.
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If a victim can adjust her own level of care to the personalized
standard and the idiosyncratic conduct of each injurer, the case for
personalizing injurers' standards of care would only be bolstered.
Such injurer-only personalization would improve not only injurers'
behavior, but also victims'. For example, if pedestrians can adjust their
precautions to the different dangers that different drivers facing dif-
ferent standards of care impose, a law that sets personalized standards
for drivers would induce pedestrians to vary their precautions effi-
ciently. Facing skilled injurers who take more care, victims would
adjust their care downwards and save some unnecessary precautions.
But what if victims have to set their level of care without
observing the personalized standards and behavior by injurers? What
if, when a car is approaching, the pedestrian cannot observe the skill
and the standard of care of the specific driver? Victims may observe
the distribution of injurers, and take a uniform level of contributory
care that best responds to this distribution of risk. In this setting, per-
sonalized injurer standards pose a challenge. Rather than facing
injurers who all take uniform care, victims now interact with injurers
who take varying levels of care. It might be thought, then, that in the
personalized standards environment, victims would have a more diffi-
cult optimization problem to solve-how to respond to a volatile care
environment. For example, what care should a pedestrian crossing a
busy intersection take, now that cars travel at different personalized
speeds? Given this difficulty, the concern is that victims might "play it
safe" and take high uniform care. If so, victims' care would be more
costly. The analysis below shows that these concerns are not generally
valid.
1. Skill-Based Personalization
We saw in Table 2 that under a uniform standard and in the
absence of self-personalization, all injurers would take a medium level
of care (costing $8 and $24 to the skilled and unskilled, respectively),
and the residual risk of harm facing the victim would be 10%. We also
saw that under a personalized standards regime, the skilled injurer
would be asked to take high care (costing $13), leaving a residual risk
of 2%; and the unskilled injurer would be asked to take low care
(costing $9), leaving a residual risk of 22%.
Under a uniform standard regime, then, the victim faces the same
risk regardless of the injurer's type-here, a 10% probability of acci-
dent. Under a personalized standard regime for injurers, the victim
faces a variance of risks-here, either 2% or 22%. In which setting
will the victim's care be more effective?
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Assuming that injurer and victim care are strategic substitutes
(more care by one party makes it optimal to take less care by the
other), as the injurer's skill increases, the victim's optimal care
decreases. The skilled injurer leaves a residual risk of only 2%, so
there is less value to additional precaution by the victim than when
the injurer is unskilled and the residual risk is 22%. But if the victim's
care cannot be tailored (either because the victim cannot know which
injurer he faces or because precautions are "lumpy" and cannot be
varied across injurers), it is possible that the overall contribution of
the victim to accident prevention would be diminished. Relative to the
case of uniform standards, where all injurers impose on the victim a
10% risk of uncompensated accidents, the victim will now seek the
most efficient response to an environment that contains injurers of
both high risks (22% chance of harm) and low risks (2%). In this envi-
ronment, it may well pay off for the victim, especially the risk-averse
type, to take more care relative to the uniform injurer standard case.
Such added care is a waste vis-A-vis the high-skill injurers, but it is all
the more valuable vis-A-vis the low-skill injurers who expose the
victim to a high risk of uncompensated accident. For example, if dif-
ferent cars on the road drive at different personalized speeds and pose
differential risks, a potential victim's care would necessarily be too
high against slow-driving cars and too low against fast-driving cars. It
might be optimal for victims in such an erratic environment to react
primarily to the subset of low-skill injurers (who create high uncom-
pensated risk), notwithstanding the redundancy of such effort in rela-
tion to the high-skill injurers.9 '
Note, however, that even if victims' care is less efficient under a
personalized standards regime, the overall effect on bilateral care
under a personalized standards regime cannot be less efficient. We
saw that personalized standards unambiguously improve the efficiency
of injurers' care. Under a personalized standards regime that takes
victim care into account in designing injurers' standards, it's always
possible to achieve the outcome of uniform standards, by unifying the
different types of injurers' standard of care. Thus, if the costs of per-
91 This observation does not change if injurers self-personalize under a uniform
standard regime. We showed that under uniform standards, low-skill injurers self-
personalize and take the socially optimal low level of care (because saving in precaution
costs outweighs the cost of liability they expect to incur by failing to meet the uniform
standard). See supra Section II.A.3. Accordingly, low-skill injurers behave the same under
either a personalized or a uniform standards regime, and impose the same high risk of
accident upon victims. With self-personalization, low-skill injurers end up incurring some
liability, which reduces the incentive of victims to take care. Nevertheless, with or without
self-personalization, a uniform standard regime imposes on victims a uniform risk of
uncompensated accident (in our example, 10% risk of $100 in harm).
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sonalized standards on victims' care are higher than the benefits of
personalized standards on injurers' care, efficiency would require that
all injurers stick to a uniform standard. After all, the presence of vic-
tims and their care is a crucial factor in efficiently personalizing the
standards of care, as well as in whether to personalize them. It is also
possible that given the tradeoff of personalization and victims' care,
personalization would be done partially. Thus, if personalization,
without taking into account victims' care, requires that given their
skillfulness some drivers will impose a risk of 30% and the others a
risk of 50%, given victims' care, personalization might end up with the
former drivers being allowed to impose a risk of 35%, and the others a
risk of 40%.
2. Risk-Based Personalization
Victims' care would be unambiguously more efficient under a
regime that personalizes injurers' standards of care according to the
risk they pose. We saw that under a uniform standard all injurers
would take a medium level of care, but would impose different risks:
5% versus 15% residual probability of harm by the safe and risky
types, respectively. We also saw that under a personalized standards
regime, the safe injurer would be asked to take low care, leaving a
residual risk of 11%; and the risky injurer would be asked to take high
care, leaving a residual risk of 3%.
Here, the effect of personalized injurer standards over victims'
care is unambiguous and desirable. Despite the fact that different
injurers are asked to take different personalized care levels, victims
overall face a less disperse distribution of risk. Under uniform injurer
standards, victims faced actors who cause either 5% or 15%
probability of harm, whereas under personalized injurer standards the
probabilities of harm are both lower and less dispersed (11% and
3%). Since the efficiency of victim care depends on the residual
probability of harm, personalized standards allow victims to confront
a less erratic distribution of such probabilities. As injurers are induced
to behave in a way that compensates for their different risks, victims
take more efficient care.
D. Ex Ante Investment in Improving Private Characteristics
Personalized standards reflect injurers' observable idiosyncratic
properties-individual traits that affect their ability to reduce the risk
of accidents. How do these traits form? The analysis so far assumed
that people vary exogenously, and that the law merely observes-but
does not influence-the development of personal traits. In this section
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we relax this assumption. We assume instead that traits are deter-
mined by investments that people make: Drivers could improve their
skills, for example, by taking driving classes and training; 92 doctors
could also improve their skills, for example, by reading more profes-
sional materials and participating in more conferences; 93 employers
can acquire more sophisticated tools and train their personnel to
reach higher skill or pose lower risk to outsiders.
We ask whether such investments would be affected by personal-
ized negligence law. Specifically, we address a powerful objection to
personalized standards-that they undermine injurers' incentives to
improve. If injurers anticipate that such investments would in turn
raise the precaution burdens imposed upon them, their incentives to
make the investments would weaken. 94 They might even be incen-
tivized to take action to diminish, rather than improve, their harm-
reduction traits. For example, if personalization indeed hurts incen-
tives to acquire skill, a firm might prefer employing less skillful
employees for risky activities (like driving), thus reducing their
expenditures on care.
1. Skill-Based Personalization
High skill warrants a high standard of care. We saw in Table 2
that under a personalized standard regime, the unskilled injurer would
face a "low" standard (at a cost of $9) whereas the skilled injurer
would face a "high" standard (at a cost of $13). Imagine that each
injurer begins as unskilled, but that prior to interaction with the victim
92 See, e.g., Lisa Dorn & David Barker, The Effects of Driver Training on Simulated
Driving Performance, 37 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 63, 68 (2005) ("It would
appear that professional driver training affects simulated driving performance with trained
drivers demonstrating a potentially safer driving style than untrained drivers."); Robert B.
Isler et al., Effects of Higher-Order Driving Skill Training on Young, Inexperienced
Drivers' On-Road Driving Performance, 43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1818,
1820-25 (2011) (showing that young, inexperienced drivers who receive training aimed at
improving skills such as situational awareness and hazard anticipation perform significantly
better at driving-related simulations).
93 See, e.g., Dave Davis et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education: Do
Conferences, Workshops, Rounds, and Other Traditional Continuing Education Activities
Change Physician Behavior or Health Care Outcomes?, 282 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 867, 867
(1999) (analyzing previous studies concerning CME (continuing medical education) and
concluding that there is some evidence that interactive, as opposed to didactic, CME
sessions can effect changes in professional practice and, on occasion, in health care
outcomes).
94 Schwartz, supra note 19, at 254-57 (arguing that while a personalized standard would
yield optimal investments in the ability to take care if courts were to measure said
expenditure and take it into account, in a more feasible scenario where ex ante investments
in skill are disregarded, injurers would not have a high enough incentive to do so and
would underinvest in the ability to avoid harm to victims).
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the injurer could become skilled by spending a lump sum cost of k. At
what levels of k would it be socially desirable to spend it? At what
levels would it be in the private interest of the injurer to make this
investment?
a. Personalized Standards
Social optimum. If the injurer remains unskilled, the optimal level
of personalized care would be "low" and the resulting social cost of
his activity would be $31. If, instead, the injurer becomes skilled, the
optimal level of care would be "high" and the social cost would be
$15. Thus, the social gain from investment in skill is $31 - $15 = $16. It
is socially desirable to make the investment in skill if k < $16.
Private incentives. The unskilled injurer faces a cost of care of $9,
whereas the skilled injurer faces a cost of care of $13. Here, investing
in becoming skilled is privately undesirable: Not only does the injurer
enjoy none of the savings such investment yields socially, but he is
saddled with a higher cost of compliance. This is a general problem.
The injurer's investment in skill improvement reduces his cost of
taking care-a social benefit that is also a private benefit. But it also
leads to an upward adjustment of the level of care-another social
benefit but one that creates a private loss. This suggests that not
enough investment in human capital would be made, and that-as
conjectured above-skill-based personalized standards undermine ex
ante investment. Relatedly, firms might prefer employing less skillful
employees.95
b. Uniform Standards with Full Compliance
Social optimum. Since the standard of care does not change for
those who become skilled, and assuming that injurers comply with the
optimal uniform standard ("medium"), the social value of the invest-
ment is the reduced cost of compliance with the uniform standard,
from $24 to $8. The investment should be made if k < $16.
Private incentive. Under a uniform standard with full compliance,
the injurer who invests in skill recoups the entire social saving,
reducing her cost of compliance from $24 to $8. Here, investment
would be optimal. Since there is no accompanying increase in the
standard, there is no divergence between the private and social incen-
tive to invest.96
95 See supra text accompanying note 94.
96 If injurers self-personalize, it is socially desirable to make an investment under
uniform standards if k < 13, since the unskilled injurer takes "low" care and imposes a
social cost of $31, whereas the skilled injurer takes "medium" care and imposes a social
cost of $18. The private incentive is the same-make the investment in skill if k < 13.
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This analysis demonstrates a robust observation. Skill-based per-
sonalization destroys the incentives to invest in improved skills. Under
a uniform standards regime, investment is optimal because the
investing injurer captures the entire social surplus from the improved
skill. In contrast, under a skill-based personalized standards regime,
the injurer does not enjoy the full social surplus from the investment
in reducing the cost of care, and may even be worse off.
To be sure, the problem of distorted ex ante investment under a
personalized standards regime can be resolved if courts could monitor
such investment. If a court has enough information to set standards
that reflect, not existing skills, but optimally acquired skills, injurers
would be prompted to make the optimal investment. If, for example, a
doctor could not invoke his low skill in defense against malpractice
and would instead be held to the optimally acquired skill, personaliza-
tion would clearly outperform a uniform standard. But the informa-
tion burden is high: It is not enough for the court to set a standard
based on optimal hypothetical skill across the entire population. For
this to be a personalized standards regime, the optimally invested skill
would then have to vary by the idiosyncratic investment traits of each
injurer.97
2. Risk-Based Personalization
High risk warrants a high standard of care. We saw in Table 3 that
under a personalized standard regime, the risky injurer would face a
"high" standard (at a cost of $26), whereas the safe injurer would face
a "low" standard (at a cost of $6). Imagine that in the absence of ex
ante investment, the injurer would be the risky type, and that it would
take an investment of k to become a safe type. At what levels of k
would it be socially desirable to spend k? What if the investment of k
were privately undertaken?
a. Personalized Standards
Social optimum. If the injurer remains risky, the lowest social cost
of his activity when he takes "high" care is $29. If, instead, the injurer
invests in becoming safe, the lowest social cost, when he takes "low"
Without the investment, the unskilled injurer self-personalizes to "low" care and faces a
cost of care of $9 and liability of $12, for a total private cost of $21, whereas the skilled
injurer takes "medium" care and incurs a cost of $8. Here, too, investment is generally
optimal. While the level of care does increase with improved skill, the injurer enjoys the
entire social benefit-a lower cost of care and the net reduction in expected harm.
97 As to the concern that firms would prefer hiring low-skilled employees for risky
activities, see supra text accompanying note 94, this concern would be avoided if the
standard of care would be personalized according to the reasonable hiring policy of the
firm, which is very hard to define given the many variables involved.
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care, is $17. Thus, the social gain from the investment is $29 - $17
$12. It is worth making the investment in safety if k < $12.
Private incentive. The risky injurer faces the cost of "high" care of
$26, whereas the safe injurer faces the cost of "low" care of $6. The
injurer would make the investment if k < $20. Here, investing in safety
is privately desirable. In fact, the private value of the investment is
greater than the social value, suggesting that too much investment
would be made.
The example exposes one side of a general problem of inefficient
investment, although the direction of the distortion may go either way
(too much or too little investment). The private value of lowering
one's riskiness is the reduced cost of complying with the lower person-
alized standard. But the social value contains an additional compo-
nent beyond the reduction in the cost of care: the change in expected
harm. This change in the expected harm is due to two factors. First,
the expected harm goes down because, all else equal, the safe injurer
poses a lower probability of accident. Second, the expected harm goes
up because the safe injurer takes lower care. In the example, the
second effect was stronger than the first, and so the expected harm
caused by the safe injurer increased relative to that of the risky injurer
(from $3 to $11). This is why the private incentive to invest was too
high. But in other situations, the first effect could be stronger than the
second, in which case there is an additional social benefit to the invest-
ment that is not captured by the injurer, and the incentive to invest in
safety under a personalized standards regime would be too small.
b. Uniform Standards with Full Compliance
Social optimum. Since the standard of care does not change for
those who invest in becoming safer, and assuming that all injurers
comply with the optimal uniform standard ("medium"), the social
value of investment is the ensuing reduction in the probability of harm
at the uniform level of care, from 15% to 5% (and the expected harm
from $15 to $5). It is worth making the investment if k < $10.
Private incentive. Under a uniform standard with full compliance,
the injurer who invests in becoming safer receives no benefit, as she
would have to continue and comply with the same standard at the
same cost. Accordingly, investments that are socially desirable are not
made. Injurers may gain other benefits from becoming less risky,
which are not captured in the example, such as the reduction of self-
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risks. Still, the point remains: Uniform standards generate too little
investment. 98
In comparison to personalized standards, the investment under a
uniform standards regime would be unambiguously lower. The reason,
as we just saw, is that personalization allows the investing injurer to
capture some benefits of his investment. 99
E. Summary
We compared two types of personalization-skill-based and risk-
based-along four dimensions: care, activity, victim's contributory
care, and ex ante investment. The main themes that emerged are the
following:
1. Personalization improves injurers' level of care.
2. The main distortions that personalization may cause are three:
excessive activity levels, costlier victim care, and weak incentives to
invest ex ante.
3. The activity-level distortion applies to the unskilled and safe
injurers, and it is due to the lower personalized standards they face. It
does not apply to skilled and risky injurers; for them, personalization
reduces the activity-level distortion that is otherwise ingrained in a
uniform standard negligence regime. Accordingly, a one-sided appli-
cation of the personalization regime-increasing the standards of care
for the skilled and risky injurers but providing no reduction for the
98 The same is true for uniform standards with self-personalization. Here, a safe injurer
ignores the uniform standard, takes "low" care, and imposes a social cost of $17, whereas a
risky injurer meets the uniform standard and imposes a social cost of $31. Thus, it is
socially desirable for the injurer to make the investment to become safe if k < $14. The
private incentive is small. The injurer who invests in becoming safe enjoys a reduction of
private cost from $16 (the cost of meeting the "medium" standard of care) to $12 (the cost
of meeting the "low" standard of care, $6, plus the expected incremental liability of $6).
Thus, the injurer would make the investment if k < $4. Another way to explain this
distortion-too little incentive to invest ex ante in reducing one's riskiness-is by
recognizing some positive social value of the investment, which the injurer cannot
expropriate. If the injurer does not invest in becoming safe, he takes "medium" care and
pays zero damages. If, instead, he does invest, he self-personalizes, takes "low" care, and
pays some damages. The investment creates a benefit for the victim, in the form of some
expected damages. Since the injurer does not internalize this benefit, his investment is too
low. Consequently, injurers have deficient incentives to become safe.
99 At the same time, we cannot rule out the nagging possibility that the overinvestment
problem of personalized standards might be worse than the underinvestment problem of
uniform standards. In the example, if k < $12, the investment is efficient but would only be
made under a personalized standards regime. If $12 < k < $20 the investment is inefficient
but would still be made under a personalized standards regime. In this case, the overall
cost of accidents, inclusive of the cost of the ex ante investment, would be higher and less
efficient under a personalized standards regime. And, finally, if k > $20, the investment
would not be made under either regime, injurers would remain risky, and there will be no
difference between the two regimes.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 2016] 667
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
unskilled and safe-would unambiguously improve injurers' activity
level.
4. The victim care distortion applies only to skill-based personal-
ization and is due to the increased variance in risks that victims face.
Risk-based personalization, by contrast, reduces this variance and
may improve the efficiency of victim care. Therefore, a personaliza-
tion regime based solely on risks would unambiguously decrease
victim costs of care.
5. The ex ante investment distortion applies mainly to skill-based
personalization; with risk-based personalization, injurers typically
have more efficient incentives to invest in decreasing their riskiness
than under a uniform standard regime. Here, too, a personalization
regime based solely on risks would unambiguously improve injurers'
incentives to invest in reducing their harmfulness.
6. The gap in incentives between a personalized standard regime
and a uniform standard regime narrows once self-personalization
under a uniform standard regime takes place. Specifically, the gap
narrows with respect to the incentives of the unskilled and safe (who
self-personalize under a uniform standard), but not with respect to the
skilled and risky (who do not self-personalize).
Table 4 summarizes our main conclusions (naturally, not all
nuances are captured by the table). Each of the four columns is a dif-
ferent regime, distinguished by the type of personalization (skill
versus risk) and the direction of standard adjustment (upward versus
downward). A "+" sign means that the specific personalized standards
regime is more efficient along that aspect than uniform standards.
TABLE 4: EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF PERSONALIZATION
Skilled: Unskilled:
up down Risky: up Safe: down
1. Level of Care + +* + +*
2. Activity Level + - + -
3. Victim Care - - + +
4. Ex Ante Investments - - + +
* Under the assumption of self-personalization, personalization has no effect compared
to a uniform standard.
III
JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS
The analysis in Part II identified the incentive effects of a person-
alized negligence regime and evaluated them along the total welfare
metric. While the overall effect is ambiguous, we nevertheless identi-
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fied several clear advantages to personalized standards, suggesting
that in a large set of circumstances it is a superior regime. The Article
does not end here, however, because two additional aspects need to
be considered. One is a feasibility aspect: Do courts have the institu-
tional capacity to implement personalized standards? This will be
taken up in Part IV below. The other is a normative aspect that often
plays a central role in evaluating tort law doctrines-whether the rule
is just. We offer in this Part a preliminary analysis of the justice con-
siderations that might be relevant to the personalization of negligence
law.
A. Corrective Justice
Corrective justice imposes primary duties on actors to refrain
from injuring others, and to repair injuries that were caused by the
violation of the primary duties.100 It mandates that the negligent
injurer should compensate the victim for her losses if, by his wrong-
doing, he infringed on his duty not to harm the victim (or to create
unreasonable risk of harm), and thus violated the equality between
the parties.101 Compensation is aimed at rectifying the injustice done
by the wrongdoer to the victim.1 0 2
Under a prominent corrective justice account, what constitutes an
unreasonable risk created by the injurer toward the victim has to be
determined without regard to the burden of reducing the risks on the
injurer.103 Being negligent is not merely failing to take cost-justified
care (as it is in economic analysis of negligence, under the Hand
100 Theories of the Common Law of Torts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Sept. 22, 2003)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories.
101 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs 77-78 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 2009).
102 See JULEs L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGs 367-69 (1992) (justifying liability for
negligence under corrective justice framework); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 145-70 (1995) (discussing negligence law under corrective justice theory). In
recent years, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have argued that tort law's goal is to
allow a remedy for victims of wrongdoing, rather than restoring them to the position they
would have been in but for the wrongdoing. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115
YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (advocating for recognition of right that empowers individuals to
seek redress against persons who have wronged them); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1643 (2002) (arguing that some avenue of
recourse other than private violence must be made available to victim); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) (arguing that the
tort system requires injurer to cover injury of specific party and entitles that party to
recover for specific injury from defendant); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 82-90 (1998) (arguing wronged plaintiff
is only entitled to use civil legal system to exact compensation from defendant).
103 See WEINRIB, supra note 102, at 147-52 (contrasting American approach, which
compares risk and cost of precautions in order to determine what constitutes reasonable
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formula). Rather, and regardless of the cost, the injurer's duty has to
comport with a reasonable conception of liberty and security for the
victim.10 4 In this light, a party may be held negligent even if the cost of
untaken care is too high under a cost-benefit analysis.
If one accepts the irrelevance-of-cost premise, then skill-based
personalization would seem to conflict with corrective justice. An
injurer's skill, as we defined it above, is primarily a measure of his
burden in reducing risks-the very factor this conception of corrective
justice rejects. An actor with relatively low skill should not be per-
mitted to satisfy a more lenient standard, and conversely, an actor
with above-average skills should not face a higher standard.
We do not accept this irrelevance-of-cost premise. As argued by
one of us previously, even under a corrective justice account, negli-
gence and unreasonable risks could not be meaningfully defined
without considering the burden of care imposed upon the injurer.105 If
a technological shock made it ten times cheaper to administer some
care measure, doesn't the victim's interest in security entitle her to
expect an increase in the amount of care used to protect her? In fact,
it is hard to see why the corrective justice account would oppose a
personalized increase in the standards of care. Even if injurers should
not be allowed to argue that because of their low skills the "average"
burden of care is too heavy for them and should be reduced, victims
should be allowed to argue that because of the injurer's high skills the
"average" burden of care is too lenient and has to be increased.106
Finally, while the case for skill-based personalization might con-
flict with some conceptions of corrective justice, the case for risk-
care, and English approach, which ignores cost of precautions altogether in formulating
proper standard of care).
104 See Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2603-04 (1995)
(arguing that objective standard of care comports with reasonable conception of liberty
and security); Jared Marshall, On the Idea of Understanding Weinrib: Weinrib and Keating
on Bipolarity, Duty, and the Nature of Negligence, 19 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 385, 398
(2010) (describing how objective standard of reasonable care reflects equal status of
parties). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating
Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2003) (arguing that subjective standard of
care comports with corrective justice rationales and that "[b]y comparing the conduct of
ordinary people to that of an idealized superhero, the law allocates fault where none exists
and labels reasonable conduct as unreasonable").
105 See Ariel Porat, Questioning the Idea of Correlativity in Weinrib's Theory of
Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 161, 167 (2001) (arguing that one cannot
characterize risk as reasonable or unreasonable without considering burden of care).
106 This counterargument can be derived from the justification for ignoring the injurer's
burden of care. As Weinrib put it, the injurer should not be allowed to unilaterally draw
the line between his and the victim's rights. WEINRIB, supra note 102, at 152. This
justification does not necessarily imply that the injurer with high skills should not do more
than the injurer with average skill to protect the victim's rights.
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based personalization would only be bolstered by this normative
framework. The focus on the duty not to expose victims to unreason-
able risk means that injurers whose conduct imposes relatively high
risk should do more to reduce it than injurers whose same conduct
imposes a lower risk. Otherwise, if both are held to the same standard,
they would expose victims to different levels of risk. Indeed, we saw in
Part II that risk-based personalization reduces the variance of risks
created by injurers.1 07 Personalized standards therefore reduce to
what should be considered an anomaly under the corrective justice
account-that some victims are presented with greater uncompen-
sated harms than others.
B. Distributive Justice
Personalization has distributive consequences. First, by treating
different injurers differently, it raises questions of distributive justice
across injurers. Indeed, we saw that personalization may increase or
decrease the variance in costs of care borne by injurers. Such unequal
allocation of the burden of care among similarly situated injurers
might be considered unjust, violating the requirement to treat like
cases alike.' 08 But is it? Are injurers similarly situated if they have
different skills or create different risks? We address this question in
Subsection 1 below.
Second, personalization of standards of care changes the alloca-
tion of accident costs between injurers and victims, trading victim
harm for injurer care. Low skill injurers, for example, are asked to
take less care even though this might result in higher harm. While
justified under cost benefit analysis, does this result conform to princi-
ples of distributive justice? Can precautions and harm be treated on
equal footing? Should the goal of preventing harms be treated with
priority over saving in precautions?1 09 These questions are the topic of
Subsection 2 below.
107 See supra Section II.C. Indeed, it might even happen-as we have demonstrated-
that personalization could make the risks created by the more risky injurer lower than
those created by the less risky one.
108 See TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRBUTIVE JUSTICE 5-7
(2007) (explaining that distributive justice theory is based on formulation of proportion
between participants regarding their possession of criteria for distribution and arguing that
it is seemingly unjust to impose different standards of care on two similarly situated
injurers). For a different argument stating that a subjective standard of care can promote
distributive goals, see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 238 (2003).
109 See Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64
MD. L. REV. 159, 178-80 (2005) [hereinafter Keating, Pricelessness] (stating that legal rules
cannot trade severe injuries for trivial precautions borne by others); see also Dilan A.
Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Putting "Duty" in Its Place: A Reply to Professors Goldberg
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1. Among Injurers
Personalization replaces a uniform one-size-fits-all standard with
a scheme that has higher variance. Engaged in the same conduct, dif-
ferent injurers are asked to meet different standards. But the distribu-
tive impact of this greater variance of standards depends on how it
affects the distribution of burdens.
Consider, first, skill-based personalization, which requires more
skilled injurers to take more care. The skilled injurers have to meet
more burdensome standards, but at the same time they are able to
meet any standard at a lower private cost. (This, recall, is the very
definition of injurer skill: more impact for any $1 of care). Under a
uniform standard regime, both the skilled and unskilled injurers are
required to take the same level of care, requiring the unskilled
injurers to spend more than the skilled injurers. Raising the standard
for the skilled injurers and lowering it for the unskilled injurers coun-
teracts this unequal cost-burden and contributes to a more equal allo-
cation of burdens.
This argument may seem to hold greater merit when skills are
distributed exogenously and are uncontrolled by injurers, as in the
case of inherited physical and cognitive abilities that are determined
by nature. There is some unfairness in the distribution of endowments
and it is offset by graduated duties. But what if skills are acquired by
injurers through deliberate investment in human capital and precau-
tion aids, as examined in Section II.D above? Should high-skill
injurers be denied the cost saving they worked hard to acquire?
Should noninvesting low-skill injurers be rewarded with a lower stan-
dard and lower burden? A possible defense of personalization even
along the dimension of deliberately acquired skills would focus on
overall progressivity of social policy. Often, individual skills-even if
acquired by deliberate investment-are also correlated with other
privileges and advantages in society at large. If skilled people are on
average better off, if they are more likely to tap into socially funded
opportunities, if social institutions allow them disproportionate access
to the opportunities to invest in skill and to benefit from their acquisi-
tion-then an offsetting burden to meet heightened standards would
and Zipursky, 41 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1225, 1248-49 (2008) (arguing that "[s]acrificing an
urgent interest-the interest in avoiding premature death or devastating injury-for the
sake of trivial gains to others cannot be justified"); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness
and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311, 355 (1996) (stating that "the
harm threatened by accidental injury and death is generally disproportionate to the harm
threatened by increased precaution costs").
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not violate an overall scheme of distributive justice and may well
improve it.lo
The picture is exactly the opposite when we evaluate the fairness
of risk-based personalization. Recall that with such personalization
there is more-not less-variance in costs of care than under a uni-
form standard regime. Is this variance justified by distributive justice
considerations? Is it justified that the risky injurers would be required
to spend more in reducing risks? As with variance in skills, to answer
this question it is important to know the reason for the variance in
riskiness. If risks are the manifestation of natural characteristics, then
greater variance in costs of care due to personalization would not be
supported by distributive justice. All the more so if uncontrollable
riskiness is correlated with lower overall wealth or wellbeing.1 11 If,
instead, injurers are able to reduce their risks by investing money,
time, and efforts, rewarding such investors with lower care burdens is
appropriate. In this case, the greater variance in the costs of care
achieved through risk-based personalization would be justified. But
again, the picture might flip when the distribution of advantages and
burdens is viewed more broadly. As with acquired skills, it is possible
that those who were able to reduce their riskiness have also managed
to systematically recoup more advantages and benefits across various
social activities, and are better off overall. Granting them yet another
advantage-lower standards of care-would violate distributive
justice.
2. Victims Versus Injurers
So far we have discussed distributive effects among injurers. Now
we turn to victims: Are the effects of personalization on victims justi-
fied by conceptions of distributive justice? Is victims' safety compro-
mised and placed at an inferior normative status relative to injurers'
attributes?1 12
As we have seen, personalization raises the standard of care for
skilled and risky injurers. At the same time it decreases the standard
of care for unskilled and safe injurers. Victims of some injurers are
therefore safer, whereas victims of other injurers are less safe. Still, as
long as victims are equally likely to face all types of injurers, the
greater efficiency of personalized standards suggests that the overall
110 See Seidelson, supra note 41, at 44-45 (explaining why subjective standard of care is
also justified according to distributive justice principles).
111 Also, risky people may be injured more often, and pay higher insurance due to
insurers' reliance on experience rating in determining premiums. Norberg, supra note 9.
112 See Keating, Pricelessness, supra note 109, at 179-80 (arguing that victim's severe
injuries should not be tradable for injurer's abilities to take precautions).
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shifting of losses to victims-namely, only those losses that injurers
are unfit to prevent-conforms to the distributive goals of tort law."13
We cannot, however, make the stronger claim-that under per-
sonalization victims face overall fewer risks and uncompensated
losses. Skilled and risky injurers take more care and reduce risks, but
unskilled and safe injurers take less care and increase risks, relative to
uniform standards. This ambiguity remains even if under uniform
standards injurers self-personalize. Recall that under uniform stan-
dards, unskilled and safe injurers may choose to ignore the standard,
take lower (and more efficient) care, and bear negligence liability.
Compared to a personalized standards regime, under a uniform stan-
dard with self-personalization victims incur two conflicting effects. On
the downside, they receive less care from the skilled or risky injurers.
On the upside, they receive full compensation from the unskilled and
safe injurers who self-personalize and are found to be negligent. It is
impossible to determine unambiguously which effect dominates.
As a caveat, it is possible to apply a partial personalization
regime that would also make victims unambiguously better off, and
thus not conflict with a victim-oriented fairness baseline. Clearly, vic-
tims would be better off if personalization is applied asymmetrically,
raising the standard of care only for the skilled and risky, and pre-
serving the uniform average standard for the rest. They would enjoy
higher safety due to higher care taken by some injurers, without the
downside of lower safety (or lower compensations) otherwise.
IV
BROADENING PERSONALIZATION
We now turn to a more pragmatic question: Is it realistic to
expect courts to implement personalized standards, and for people to
correctly anticipate these burdens? Our discussion so far showed that
personalization-if done correctly-can provide efficiency and fair-
ness gains which current law does not realize. But does it create infor-
mational burdens too heavy for the legal system to bear? Can courts
do what has become common practice in many industries and utilize
more fine data to set personalized standards of care? If so, how far
should personalization go?
In this Part, we argue that any personal information that is fea-
sible for courts to reliably collect and for individual actors to reliably
foresee should be factored into personalized standards. This includes
information about individual characteristics, including physical,
113 See Logue & Avraham, supra note 108, at 237-38 (arguing that subjective standard
of care may conform to distributive justice principles).
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genetic, cognitive, and emotional, as well as information about indi-
vidual resources and past experience. The information could be col-
lected through standard "low-intensity" methods such as past records,
observable traits, tests, and screens. The information could also be
collected through "high-intensity" methods such as Big Data and
machine-learning prediction methods. While the feasibility of some of
these methods may still be limited by technological and legal con-
straints, our goal is to demonstrate the enormous potential that
nonpersonalized negligence law is threatening to leave untapped.
As the amount of relevant information may be large and growing,
the implementation of personalized standards is limited by several
constraints. First, courts may be only partially able to translate person-
alized data into individual standards, lacking the actuarial expertise to
make the fine-tuned, continuous adjustments. This problem can be
solved, we argue, by a regime of qualitative step-adjustments in the
standards-similar to the sentencing guidelines approach in criminal
law. Second, personalized standards can have the desirable deterrent
effect only to the extent that actors can anticipate them. Calibrating
the standards too finely along a continuous range could create uncer-
tainty among actors, which itself distorts care choices.' 14 We argue,
perhaps counterintuitively, that it often would be easier for injurers to
anticipate personalized standards than uniform ones, because they
know more about their own characteristics than about the general dis-
tribution of characteristics in society.
Some of the evidentiary proposals presented in this Part may
strike readers as a fantasy. They create a different model of informa-
tion acquisition by courts than the traditional rules of evidence and
civil procedure. We nevertheless present these ideas as a benchmark
for discussion. Our argument, in a nutshell, is that if procedural and
ethical rigidities can be overcome, the law could make advances sim-
ilar to ones made in areas like medicine, insurance, marketing, or edu-
cation. There is a large potential for improving the deterrent effect of
114 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (analyzing inefficient effects of
uncertain legal standards). Calfee and Craswell have further developed their analysis in
later articles. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) (formalizing and extending analysis of
authors' prior work on inefficient effects of uncertain legal standards while focusing on
three factors-the shape of the uncertainty in the law, the costs and benefits created by the
activity, and the penalty structure for violating the law-that determine which incentives
are likely to dominate in an uncertain legal system); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Should
Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325, 325 (1998)
(exploring ramifications of determining product liability in hindsight and noting
uncertainty effects that it creates upon manufacturers).
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negligence law, without sacrificing (and perhaps also promoting)
important notions of corrective and distributive justice.
A. Procedures for Implementing Personalized Standards
The first question any personalization regime has to address is the
degree of granularity. A more granular regime distinguishes individ-
uals more finely and adjusts the standards based on more factors, sen-
sitive to more kinds of information. At the extreme, the most granular
regime requires courts to tailor the standard of care for each injurer
along a continuum, shifting it up or down in response to every bit of
individualized information (the "continuum mode" of
personalization).
Choosing the optimal granularity of a personalized standards
regime is a problem of information costs. First, it might be costly for
courts to collect the information necessary to tailor different standards
of care for each and every injurer. It is cheaper and easier for courts to
avoid the information-rich inquiry of personalized standards and
implement a one-size-fits-all uniform standard. Even if personal infor-
mation is collected and presented at trial, there are limits to courts'
abilities to process the available data and translate it accurately into
adjustments of the standard of care (and even more so when jurors
are involved). This requires actuarial expertise that courts often lack.
Second, like courts, injurers facing personalized standards need
to take into account personal traits when trying to anticipate and per-
form their duties of care and understand how courts would require
them to behave. Is it realistic to expect injurers to make such informed
assessments? Can they adapt their behaviors to the standard of care
they are required to meet under the continuous mode? Are uniform
standards easier to anticipate?
It might seem, intuitively, that the information problems faced by
courts and by injurers in a personalized standards regime are similar.
Since, by definition, personalized standards rely on more richly tuned
and finely partitioned information, they inflict on all participants in
the regime, including courts (ex post) and injurers (ex ante), a more
daunting informational task. But upon further reflection we claim that
this conjecture is false. In fact, it is easier for injurers to anticipate
what is reasonable for them, given their personal characteristics, than
to extrapolate what is reasonable for the average person in society.
We know our riskiness and skill better than we know the societal dis-
tributions of these traits, and we can act intuitively upon this self-
knowledge. True, people may learn or infer the uniform societal stan-
dards without having to know the exact distributions over the entire
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society by observing past cases and by following societal norms. But in
a regime that relies on ex post standards (which, unlike ex ante rules,
do not articulate bright-line commands) such learning of what the uni-
form standard requires is slow and imperfect. Personalized standards,
by contrast, require no learning, as much as they harness information
injurers already have about themselves. 1 5
The problem for injurers is that while they may have a good sense
of what individually optimal behavior is, given their idiosyncratic
traits, they still need to anticipate the personalized standards that an
imperfect court would impose on them. Even if courts set personal-
ized standards that are unbiased, their tailoring would have some
degree of inaccuracy (random errors). Having to anticipate such
imperfect tailoring of personalized standards, injurers' informational
burden would be compounded.
To overcome some of the information costs that courts face, and
to help injurers predict how standards would be personalized, we pro-
pose two procedural refinements to a personalized standards regime:
(1) gradual personalization and (2) presumptions.
Gradual Personalization. A continuous mode of personaliza-
tion-under which every bit of personalized information can shift the
standard incrementally-would likely involve excessive information
costs. It would be too costly for courts to implement case by case, and
too costly for injurers to anticipate the patterns of courts' judgments.
To reduce these information problems, personalized standards
may be set along a scheme of discrete qualitative steps-what we call
"gradual personalization." According to this scheme, courts would
have to choose among a limited number of standards-for example, a
three-step scheme of high, medium, and low-and pigeon-hole
injurers into these groups. Gradual personalization is similar to a sen-
tencing guidelines scheme that provides qualitative step-like adjust-
ments to judgments based on case-specific characteristics, but stops
short of the continuous mode. For example, while drivers' skills and
riskiness may vary along a continuum, justifying driving their cars at a
different speed under similar circumstances of the road and traffic, the
gradual personalization scheme would require them to drive at low,
115 This is not always the case. New drivers, for example, might be unaware of their
skills, and learning, by observing the uniform standards applied to all, might sometimes be
a better option than adapting their behaviors to their perceived subjective skills. There is
also the risk that actors, under a personalized standard regime, would be "over-optimistic"
about their abilities, and that might distort their incentives, encouraging them to create too
high risks. That problem, however might distort incentives also under a uniform standard
regime. Furthermore, risk aversion might counteract overoptimism under a personalized
standard regime.
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medium, or high speeds. Thus, at similar situations, one driver would
be expected to drive no more than fifteen miles per hour, another
driver up to twenty miles per hour, while a third driver would be
allowed to reach twenty-five miles per hour.
Gradual personalization would certainly be an improvement
compared to the current uniform standards rule. It is more practical
and easy to implement than a pure personalization rule. And the
degree of granularity (the number of steps) would depend on the vari-
ance of personal attributes and the costs for courts of making finer
personal determinations, and for injurers of anticipating these
partitions.
Presumptions.11 6 The information cost burden on courts can be
reduced by a scheme that elicits private information from injurer
defendants (and does not rely on utilization of Big Data). Consider,
first, a simple presumption that injurers are average skilled.117 Unless
information is presented to rebut this presumption, courts would set
the uniform midlevel standard of care. The injurer-defendant may
present evidence to rebut the presumption.118 Assume that courts
have no upfront information, but can tell if the information provided
by the litigants is credible. Low-skill injurers would have the incentive
to produce such evidence to the court and reveal their true type, so as
to enjoy a more forgiving standard. The problem, of course, is that
high-skill injurers would not. Some evidence regarding the high skill
of a particular defendant may be obtained by the plaintiff through
discovery and presented to court; and sometimes courts would be able
to infer, from defendant's silence, that she is the high-skill type. But
such information would unravel only partially, and the separation of
types would not be perfect.
To improve the incentives to provide courts with the defendants'
private information, imagine instead a more strategic design of the
presumption. Consider a presumption of high skill: If there is no addi-
tional information, the standard of care is set at the very high level,
reflecting the optimal care for the most skilled injurer. This presump-
tion, too, can be rebutted by evidence the injurer produces. Now,
however, all injurers along the spectrum of skill (other than those at
the very top) would have the incentive to reveal themselves-to
demonstrate that the standard is unrealistically demanding in their
116 We are grateful to Michael Trebilcock for suggesting that this procedure be
examined.
117 Similar analysis would apply to evidence regarding the riskiness of the individual
injurer.
n1 The victim-plaintiff may present evidence too, but it would largely be based on
information obtained through discovery from the defendant.
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particular circumstances. With more complete unraveling of private
information, courts end up with as much information as injurers pri-
vately possess.
Using such a presumption is not cost free. Some defendants
would face the dilemma of whether to reveal medical, psychological,
or other sensitive information. Revealing information relating to
various kinds of low skill might have adverse consequences elsewhere,
for example in the workplace. Still, it is quite common for tort plain-
tiffs to reveal sensitive information, for example pertaining to medical
conditions. In the same way that a plaintiff should consider whether to
reveal private information for the purpose of expanding tort liability
and recovery, defendants would elect whether to reveal private infor-
mation to qualify for a lower standard of care.
B. Which Personal Information?
Another aspect of accuracy, apart from granularity as discussed
above, addresses the types of information a personalized standards
regime incorporates. It seeks to distinguish people according to their
tendencies to create risks and their capabilities to prevent them. But
which information should be drawn upon? Which individual charac-
teristics should be the basis for personalized negligence law?
Our discussion in this section is intended to begin charting the
informational potential that personalized standards could unleash.
This includes physical and genetic information about people as well as
personality information including cognitive skills and emotional
aspects. It could be learnt either from general data and statistics
relating to the injurer's attributes such as age, gender, education, and
profession, or from personal information collected directly through
medical, physical, or psychological tests and from past behavior that
resembles the behavior in question. It could also be inferred from past
behavior that is different from the behavior in question but could
reveal capabilities which are relevant to the assessment of the
behavior in question.
The information relevant to setting personalized standards can be
collected through traditional methods such as public records or exami-
nation scores, but it could also be collected from large digital
databases-Big Data. The term Big Data refers to databases with
enormous quantities of information. 119 Data mining-the process of
119 See Liane Colonna, A Taxonomy and Classification ofData Mining, 16 SMU Sci. &
TECH. L. REV. 309, 329-31 (2013) (defining Big Data and explaining how data mining
works); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 1435-36 (discussing usage of Big Data and
explaining how it can be used for personalizing default rules).
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discovering human behavior patterns in these large-scale databases-
allows predictions of future behavior across many dimensions. Big
Data analysis can predict various risks, personal characteristics, pref-
erences, and many other aspects relevant in the determination of
optimal legal standards.
1. Physical Characteristics
Different people impose different risks on others based on their
physical characteristics. For example, a short driver might create
higher risks than tall drivers toward both other drivers and pedest-
rians, because she might only have a narrow vision of the road; 120
drivers with impaired vision are likely to impose higher risks on
others;1 21 and the same is true with respect to drivers who have
hearing difficulties. 1 2 2 Higher risks might justify demanding more pre-
cautions from the actor creating the risks.
Research conducted in the field of system design of planes and
automobiles indicates a relationship between certain human traits and
the capabilities to perform a certain task. For example, research con-
ducted by J. E. Korteling showed-quite unsurprisingly-that older
drivers (sixty-one to seventy-three years old) and drivers with brain
injury history have significantly longer reaction time than younger
drivers (twenty-one to forty-three years old).12 3 Age is also a signifi-
cant factor in predicting drivers' ability to avoid lane crossing 24 and
120 See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 119, at 283 n.10 (citing Mahan v. State, 191 A. 575, 580
(Md. 1937) (holding that driver whose short stature imposed limitations on her vision is
expected to exercise "greater watchfulness" to avoid injuring others)). A few car
manufacturers, being aware of short drivers' visibility problem, offer some models for
shorter people. See Jerry Kronenberg, 5 Best Cars for Short Drivers, THESTREET (Sept. 20,
2013), www.yahoo.com/autos/s/5-best-cars-for-short-drivers-213753032.html; Christina
Rogers, Better Cars for Short and Tall Drivers, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 9, 2013, 7:10 PM),
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304626104579123411103492676.
121 See Karlene Ball et al., Visual Attention Problems as a Predictor of Vehicle Crashes in
Older Drivers, 34 INVESTIGATIVE OPHTHALMOLOGY & VISUAL Sci. 3110, 3118 (1993)
(showing that older drivers with severe sensitivity loss in both eyes have twice the number
of crashes than older drivers with normal visual field sensitivity).
122 See Louise Hickson et al., Hearing Impairment Affects Older People's Ability to
Drive in the Presence of Distracters, 58 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'v 1097, 1101-12 (2010)
(showing that people with moderate to severe hearing impairment had significantly poorer
driving performance in presence of distracters than those with normal or mild hearing
impairment).
123 See J.E. Korteling, Perception-Response Speed and Driving Capabilities of Brain-
Damaged and Older Drivers, 32 HUM. FACTORS 95 (1990) (describing experiments
regarding reaction-time tasks and driving tasks that were conducted to identify variables
that may be sensitive to the effects of aging).
124 See Janet P. Szlyk et al., Relative Effects of Age and Compromised Vision on Driving
Performance, 37 Hum. FACTORS 430, 430-36 (1995) (describing experiment held in order
to determine effects of age and compromised vision on driving skills).
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their braking response time. 125 In our example in the Introduction, a
sixty-five-year-old man probably imposes higher risk on others than
the average driver, and his reaction time is probably longer than that
of the average driver. The higher risk would optimally require him to
drive slower, while the longer reaction time might justify relaxing the
"reaction time standard."
2. Cognitive and Emotional Characteristics
Risk creation is also linked to mental and cognitive capabilities
and traits. For example, a driver with high spatial awareness can better
avoid dangerous situations and should face an elevated standard that
would prompt her to utilize more of her skill.126 Human traits such as
impulsivity, risk taking, and sensation seeking increase the likelihood
of a person to engage in dangerous activities, thereby imposing risks
on others. 127 Therefore, a sensation-seeking doctor might be more
prone to appraise risks as lower than a low-sensation-seeking doctor.
We might want to require the former doctor-or his employer-to
take extra precautions before making crucial decisions involving risk
estimation.
A conscientious person tends to be more organized and prefer
planned rather than spontaneous behavior. 128 This tendency has a
clear implication for the way different people perform their tasks and
the precautions they could take to reduce risks. It might be reasonable
to have different demands and expectations from actors who tend to
be planners (and may be more responsible, organized, and reliable) 129
and from actors who are spontaneous. Those demands and expecta-
tions might change across activities. Sometimes we might demand that
actors who are less organized take more precautions to decrease risks
125 See id. at 435 (showing that older groups had poorer driving-related skills than
younger groups on simulator missions).
126 See K. WOCHINGER & D. BOEHM-DAVIS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE EFFECTS OF
AGE, SPATIAL ABILITY, AND NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION ON NAVIGATIONAL
PERFORMANCE (1995) (showing that navigational ability, which is linked to car accidents'
involvement, declines with age due to decrements in spatial ability and perceptual speed).
127 See Marvin Zuckerman & D. Michael Kuhlman, Personality and Risk-Taking:
Common Biosocial Factors, 68 J. PERSONALITY 999, 1000 (2000) (explaining that some
personality traits, such as sensation seeking, are relevant to risk-taking inclination).
128 See Daniele Quercia et al., Our Twitter Profiles, Our Selves: Predicting Personality
with Twitter, in 2011 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVACY, SECURITY, RISK
AND TRUST AND IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL COMPUTING 180, 180
(2011) (analyzing relationship between personality and different types of Twitter users).
129 See Jennifer Golbeck et al., Predicting Personality with Social Media, in THE 29TH
ANNUAL CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 253, 254 (2011)
(presenting method of predicting human personality through information available in
Facebook profiles).
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(in the case of doctors, for example), while sometimes the less organ-
ized and more spontaneous actors might be the ones more capable to
react to unexpected circumstances (say, unexpected risks in the road)
and that might affect the standard of care most suitable for them.
Reaction time while performing a dangerous task depends, we
saw, on physical aspects, but also on psychological factors such as
fatigue, aging, history of brain damage, and use of drugs. 30 A surgeon
who suffers from sleep deprivation is likely to impose a higher risk to
patients than other surgeons. Also, when the time of performing a
task increases-such as when the operation on a patient becomes
longer-the surgeon's fatigue increases, resulting in significant
increase in reaction time and in risk to patients.1s3 This might justify
an increase in the standard of care from doctors who suffer from sleep
deprivation, for example by requiring them to take longer breaks in
extended shifts, or if this is impossible, requiring them to take more
precautions as the operation progresses. And, conversely, when taking
a break or taking other precautions is impractical, it might be justified
to relax-rather than elevate-the standard of care. As urgency rises
and care becomes costlier, the optimal level should correspondingly
adjust.
Big Data can be a reliable source for learning about injurers' cog-
nitive skills and intelligence, sometimes more so than direct exams,
because it is not as manipulable (people may underperform on exams
if high scores raise their burden of care). For example, according to
some studies, intelligence and cognitive abilities can be predicted to a
high degree of accuracy based on records of users' "likes" on
Facebook. One study found that strong predictors of high intelligence
included "likes" to the Facebook pages for "Thunderstorms," "The
Colbert Report," "Science," and "Curly Fries," and that low intelli-
gence correlated with "likes" to the pages for "Sephora," "I Love
Being A Mom," "Harley Davidson," and "Lady Antebellum."1 3 2 Sim-
ilarly, a person's level of education can be inferred by analyzing
search terms and web pages accessed by her,133 although in most
130 VALERIE J. GAWRON, HUMAN PERFORMANCE MEASURES HANDBOOK 41 (2000).
131 See Wayne C. Harris et al., Performance, Workload, and Fatigue Changes Associated
with Automation, 5 Iwr'L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 169, 176-85 (1995) (discussing influence
of workload and fatigue in multitask environment).
132 Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital
Records of Human Behavior, 110 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sa. U.S. 5802, 5804 (2013).
133 See Dan Murray & Kevan Durrell, Inferring Demographic Attributes of Anonymous
Internet Users, in WEB USAGE ANALYSIS AND USER PROFILING 7, 14-18 (Brij Masand &
Myra Spiliopoulou eds., 2000) (showing that demographic facts such as gender, age,
income, marital status, and level of education can be inferred through usage information
analysis).
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cases, for personalizing the standard of care, the level of education can
be more easily learned from direct resources. Or, there is some evi-
dence that users with different personalities prefer different website
categories. For example, people with a tendency to be well-organized
prefer websites such as kodak.com, education.com, exct.net,
ecnext.com, and ecollege.com.1 3 4 The tendency of a person to be well-
organized could be a consideration in setting a personalized standard
of care for him.135 Big Data analysis can also help courts identify risk-
taking inclination', which could be essential for setting a personalized
standard of care. Thus, one study has found that tendency towards
risky driving is correlated with risky financial behaviors.136 Knowing
how people invest might tell us also how they drive.
Of course, not every behavioral study published in a social sci-
ence journal should budge the standard of care. Many findings are
preliminary and perhaps questionable. The point we stress is the
power of statistical analysis of Big Data to pick up factors that, if con-
fidently identified, can tell us a significant amount about people's risk-
iness and their skill in accident prevention.
Another type of information relevant to the determination of
standards of care is behavioral genetics information. It connects
mental and cognitive abilities and hormonal and neurological influ-
ences.137 Emerging developments in brain imaging technology enable
better understanding of human behavior. One such development is
MRI testing, and its complement fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging), which allows examination of the way the brain
works during the performance of particular tasks. 38 The MRI tests
measure changes in blood oxygenation levels in order to identify
134 Michal Kosinski et al., Personality and Website Choice (June 22, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/pkohlilpapers/kskbg-acmweb
sci_2012.pdf.
135 As we argued earlier in this section, it might be reasonable to demand that less
organized actors take more precautions in order to decrease the risks they create.
136 See Edward R. Morrison et al., Health Shocks and Household Financial Fragility:
Evidence from Automobile Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy Filings 3 (Coase-Sandor
Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 655 2013), https://www.researchgate.net/publica
tion/251315742_HealthShocksandHouseholdFinancial FragilityEvidence-fromAuto
mobileCrashesandConsumer_Bankruptcy (explaining that persistent financial distress
may encourage risky behavior).
137 See Robert Plomin & Avshalom Caspi, Behavioral Genetics and Personality, in
HANDBOOK OF PERSONALYTY 251, 261-67 (Lawrence A. Pervin & Oliver P. John eds., 2d
ed. 1999) (providing overview of research on contribution of genes to personality).
138 See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort
Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. Sc. &
TECH. L. REV. 235, 240-41 (2012) (explaining fMRI technique).
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which regions of the brain work during a specific task.139 Although
MRI images require substantial interpretation, they are considered
valuable in demonstrating cognitive processes and have in fact been
proposed as a tool in tort cases, and some uses of this technique in
criminal cases has already begun. 140 MRI tests, and neuroscience
more generally, could inform the court as to how to define the stan-
dard of care in a more concrete and nuanced manner than currently
done.141
Specifically, some research has shown a correlation between
impulsivity, emotional reactions, and violent behaviors on the one
hand, and specific activity in several areas in the brain on the other.142
It has shown a significant neurological basis of aggressive and violent
behaviors. 143 Once a defendant undergoes MRI or fMRI tests, the
findings can be used by courts for personalizing the standard of care.
Thus, if those tests point to the defendant's impulsiveness and aggres-
siveness, courts might make the proper adjustment in the standard of
care.
3. Past Behaviors
We distinguish between similar past behaviors and different past
behaviors. Similar past behaviors can often be a good proxy for the
defendant's abilities and tendencies regarding risk creation and pre-
caution taking. Thus, a driver's record of traffic violations could be
used to personalize her standard of care.1" Information about a
doctor's past malpractice behavior might also be used by the court in
139 Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed,
2009 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 81, 84-85.
140 See Eggen & Laury, supra note 138, at 249-52 (describing various cases, mainly
criminal, in which fMRI has been used in courts).
141 See Patricia Smith Churchland, Moral Decision-Making and the Brain, in
NEUROETHICS 3, 10-14 (Judy Illes ed., 2006) (arguing that fMRI can be used in order to
identify neurobiological differences between voluntary and involuntary action).
142 See Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and
Antisocial Behavior, 1 Soc. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203, 205 (2006)
(summarizing brain imaging studies conducted on antisocial, violent, and psychopathic
groups).
143 See Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies of Aggressive and
Violent Behavior: Current Findings and Implications for Criminology and Criminal Justice,
6 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 176, 179-84 (2005) (discussing neuroimaging studies that
demonstrated abnormal brain activity in aggressive and violent offenders).
144 See Colonna, supra note 119, at 360 (showing that data mining can be used to track
past traffic violations).
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personalizing the standard of care. 45 On many occasions, this kind of
information is available through official records.146
More problematic is the usage of information about different past
behaviors of the defendant and learning from these about her capabil-
ities as a potential wrongdoer. As we have explained, in the era of Big
Data it is no longer difficult to collect information about the defen-
dant's past behavior as a consumer, driver, employee, patient, student,
and in many other capacities. As we have demonstrated, this past
behavior might be associated with specific capabilities and traits which
are relevant to the process of personalizing the standard of care.
Using past behavior as a predictor of risk and as a factor in deter-
mining the optimal precaution is a hallmark of insurance actuari-
alism-a practice known as experience rating. Every driver is familiar
with the increase in insurance premium after an accident. This tech-
nique-personalizing the premium charged to each policyholder
based on past behavior-is founded on the same tailored-treatment
logic as personalized standards of care. In the insurance context, the
use of Big Data and high-intensity information models is their bread
and butter. Auto insurers, for example, invite policyholders to install
data recording devices in their cars, which transmit information to
insurers about driving habits, risk taking, and the competence of the
driver-information that is then factored into the personalized pricing
of the auto insurance policy. 147 While courts cannot base judgments
on similarly installed recorders of conduct, they can tap into any avail-
able resource of personal information to observe past behavior and
adjust the standard accordingly.
4. Resources
Another source of information, often readily available, is about
people's resources. It is sometimes argued that the wealth of the
injurer should be factored into the design of negligence standards,
perhaps because high-resource injurers can more easily afford greater
145 See Public Use Data File, NAT'L PRAc. DATA BANK, www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/
publicData.jsp (last updated Feb. 2016) (containing selected variables from medical
sources concerning physicians, dentists, and other licensed health care practitioners).
146 See Colonna, supra note 119, at 358 (discussing huge amounts of data that law
enforcement agencies acquire through Big Data records); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note
11, at 1437 (explaining how companies use publicly available data as well as proprietary
data to gauge customer preferences).
147 See Brad Tuttle, Big Data Is My Copilot: Auto Insurers Push Devices that Track
Driving Habits, TIME (Aug. 6, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/08/06/big-data-is-my-
copilot-auto-insurers-push-devices-that-track-driving-habits/ (reporting on new Big Data
devices that help insurers profile their customers' driving habits).
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expenditures on care.148 Inasmuch as such wealth-based standards are
aimed at improving wealth distribution in society, income taxes and
fiscal policies are thought to be superior tools, in the sense that they
achieve redistribution more efficiently and comprehensively.1 49 It
might be thought, for example, that a small rural hospital should not
be held to the same standards of medical care as a large city hospital,
because the smaller facility cannot afford and should not be asked to
make the same level of expenditure in advanced medical equipment.
The small hospital may well face a lower standard of medical care, but
not because of "affordability" or wealth. Rather, because it treats
smaller populations, the value of investment in some devices is lower
and insufficient to justify the costs.
CONCLUSION
This Article examined the justifications for a new type of negli-
gence law-abandoning the objective reasonable person standard and
adopting instead a personalized subjective standard of care. It identi-
fied several important efficiency advantages to the selective adoption
of personalized standards, and argued that tort law's other possible
objectives, including corrective and distributive justice, would also be
served.
Our analysis reveals that personalization could be made in two
dimensions: the skill dimension and the risk dimension. Indeed, the
efficiency considerations (level of care, activity level, victim care, and
ex ante investment) as well as the justice considerations (corrective
and distributive justice) often vary depending on whether personaliza-
tion is made according to the skill or according to the risk dimension,
and also whether it is done to increase or decrease the standard of
care relative to the uniform standard. Table 5 summarizes all the con-
siderations, according to the skill-risk and increase-decrease (up-
down) dimensions.
148 See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 57, at 421-23 (arguing that care expenditures impose
lesser burden on the rich and thus can be raised more than on the poor).
149 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-69 (1994) (arguing that
tax policies are more efficient than legal regulation in achieving distributive goals).
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TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF PERSONALIZATION
Skilled: Unskilled: Risky: Safe:
up down up down
A. Efficiency
1. Level of Care + +* + +*
2. Activity Level + - + -
3. Victim Care - - + +
4. Ex Ante Investments - - + +
B. Corrective Justice +** - + +
C. Distributive Justice
1. Among Injurers +***_+***__** _ ***
2. Injurers vs. Victims + - + -
* Under the assumption of self-personalization, personalization has no effect compared
to a uniform standard.
** Corrective justice might require the skilled injurer to do more than average, but
would not allow the unskilled injurer to do less than average.
* This conclusion might change if skills/safeness are deliberately acquired.
As the table indicates, the most favorable case for personalization
is increasing the standard of care for risky injurers. It might raise some
distributive justice concerns, especially if riskiness is exogenously
determined. Increasing the standard of care for skilled injurers also
has many more pros than cons, although it does raise concerns about
potential victims' level of care, and might also create inefficient incen-
tives to invest in improving one's skills. As we have explained, how-
ever, in the process of personalization, victim's care should be
considered, and this might limit the extent of personalization.o50 And
the ex ante investment problem could be attenuated if personalization
takes into account the optimal investment that the injurer should
make in improving his skills.151
Personalization requires enormous amounts of information and
much expertise in applying it, and we argued that advances in infor-
mation technology could put the legal system on the path to such
information-rich procedures. Even if the legal system lags behind
other institutions in Big Data advances, we argued that in the short
run using a gradual mode of personalization-by applying several dis-
crete steps within the standard of care-is relatively easy to
implement.
Like any other use of Big Data, privacy concerns might slow
down the personalization of the standard of care. We believe they
should not. One such concern is that the usage of Big Data in courts
150 See supra text accompanying note 91.
151 See supra text accompanying note 96.
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would encourage further collection of sensitive information, which
may be used to infringe people's privacy. But data about human char-
acteristics has yielded enormous returns and will continue to be col-
lected and used for commercial purposes, so there is no reason to
assume that the further use of it by courts for a public purpose would
have any significant effect on its already-occurring collection.1 52
Another concern is that Big Data and fMRI tests would infringe on
the privacy of the particular injurers sued in court since it exposes
personal characteristics. There are ways to protect people from
embarrassing revelations and restrict their use to trials without aban-
doning the entire project. And it would be in the interest of many
injurers to voluntarily subject themselves to such screening, if they
expect the findings to reduce their personalized standards of care.
Such voluntary submission to screening would thus occur along the
familiar unraveling dynamic,1 53 because those injurers who refused to
cooperate in tailoring the standard of care would be suspected by
courts of being injurers for whom a high standard of care is
appropriate.
This paper studies personalization of negligence law, but there is
no reason to stop there. One of us previously suggested personaliza-
tion of other areas of law-disclosures and default rules.154 We can
also think of personalized regulatory standards, personalized penal-
ties, and a host of applications of the idea of personalized standards
beyond the realm of tort law. Personalization is the trajectory of many
other social and private institutions, like insurance, medicine, educa-
tion, employment, product design, and advertising. In all these areas,
personalization has yielded substantial progress, even if some of its
risks have to be monitored and regulated. In the same way that per-
sonalized medicine can save lives and avoid inefficient uniform treat-
ments, personalized safety standards can reduce the social costs of
accidents. How long will negligence law resist this enormous value of
information?
152 See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 1467-69 (noting tradeoff between privacy
and personalization and contending that following industry's lead in making consumers
aware of benefits of personalization may engender greater willingness to share).
153 See DOUGLAs G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 2, 89-90 (1994)
(defining game theory concept of "unraveling" as "situations in which the ability of people
to draw inferences from silence leads to the revelation of information").
154 See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 1417-21, 1470-76 (proposing use of Big
Data to personalize default terms in contracts and wills and to target disclosures based on
relevance to recipient).
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